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Collective Bargaining in Chapter 11 and 
Beyond 
B. Glenn Georget 
Union relations may be the least of the difficulties facing an employer 
confronted with bankruptcy. Another employer may consider union wage 
and benefit demands one of the primary problems behind the company's 
failure. 1 In either situation, management is likely to be more concerned 
about the survival of the business than about any legal restrictions on its 
ability to implement wage cuts required to accomplish the rehabilitation. 2 
Undoubtedly this same concern about the continued viability of the com-
pany has recently prompted a number of unions to compromise employee 
benefits in order to assist financially-troubled employers. 3 When the em-
ployer refuses to consult with the union about changes in employment 
terms, however, the union has no opportunity to participate in those deci-
sions affecting the employees. The potentially conflicting goals of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor Relations Act in such circum-
stances confuse both the existence and extent of the employer's legal duty 
to bargain with the union. 
t Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (College of Wiiiiam and Mary). 
B.A., 1975, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hiii; J.D., 1978, Harvard Law School. 
1. After filing for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code and cutting wages 45 to 50%, the 
President of Continental Airlines commented, "Our sole problem was labor." Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 
1983, at 1, col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at D6, col. 2 (discussing connection between 
Continental's financial and labor problems). 
2. Business filings under Chapter 11 have increased dramatically in recent years. In the nine-
month period following October 1, 1979, the effective date of the current Bankruptcy Code, only 
4,002 filings were recorded. 1980 An. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR, Table F3BC. That 
number grew over 300% by 1984. During the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1984, 17,213 
filings were reported. 1984 AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR, Table F-2. See also 1983 An. 
OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR 420, Table F-3A (18,306 business filings under Chapter 11); 
1982 AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR 400, Table F-3A (12,385 business filings under 
Chapter 11); 1981 An. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR 552, Table F-3A (7,230 business 
filings under Chapter 11 ). 
3. See, e.g., Wage Concessions at Eastern Air, 118 LAB. REI- REP. (BNA) 132 (Feb. 18, 1985) 
(extension of wage concessions by Eastern Airlines' three unions); Wage Concessions During First 
Nine Months, 117 LAB. REI- REP. (BNA) 181 (Nov. 5, 1984) (reporting wage freezes or reductions 
in almost one-third of contract settlements negotiated during first three quarters of 1984); Wage Cuts 
for UPI Employees, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 61 (Sept. 24, 1984) (Wire Service Guild agrees to 
8% wage cut to assist United Press International); Teamsters Approval of Pay Cut, Stoclr. Plan, 115 
LAB. REI- REP. (BNA) so uan. 16, 1984) (in exchange for stock, Teamsters approve five-year, 15% 
wage cut to assist trucking company). For other examples of union concessions to financially-troubled 
businesses, see First Nat'! Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 n.19 (1981); Note, Col-
lective Bargaining Over Plant Relocation Decisions: Let's Malr.e a Deal, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 715, 
744-45 n.213 (1983). 
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In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,' the Supreme Court made two funda-
mental mistakes in its resolution of this basic tension between the Bank-
ruptcy Code15 and the National Labor Relations Act.6 First, the Court 
failed to identify fully and to address the nature of the NLRA violations 
involved in the case. Second, with more serious implications, the Court 
misconceived the entire thrust of the nation's labor policy. This Article 
examines these errors and attempts a better reconciliation of the conflict 
between the two statutes. 
By filing a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a company places itself under the bankruptcy court's juris-
diction to arrange a payment plan for creditors while allowing the enter-
prise to get back on its feet.7 As part of the rehabilitation process, the 
debtor often wants to reduce employee wages and benefits. When a collec-
tive bargaining agreement governs the terms of employment, the debtor 
faces a two-part problem. She must first be allowed to avoid her contrac-
tual obligations. Once the agreement has been removed as an obstacle, she 
must then be permitted to reduce wages and benefits. Although both steps 
often occur simultaneously, each implicates different statutory rights and 
duties under the Labor Act and the Bankruptcy Code. 
The right to reject burdensome contracts represents one of the most sig-
nificant privileges granted a debtor under Chapter 11. The rejection of a 
collective bargaining agreement, however, conflicts with section 8{d) of the 
NLRA which prohibits mid-term contract modifications.8 In facing this 
tension, the lower courts uniformly had agreed that, under some circum-
stances, the exigencies of bankruptcy must override the Labor Act's pro-
tection of collective bargaining agreements, but the courts had differed 
over the standard appropriate to allow such rejection. 9 The Supreme 
Court's long-awaited decision in Bildisco 10 resolved this much discussed11 
4. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984), affg 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), denying enforcement of 255 
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1981). 
5. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-151326 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-1985) ("the Code"). 
6. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985) ["the NLRA," "the Labor Act," or "the 
Act"). 
7. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-74. 
8. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d). 
9. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
10. 104 S. Ct. 1188. . 
11. See, e.g., Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by 
Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983); Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479, 492-98 (1974); Pulliam, The Rejection of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1984); 
Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Efftct on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 391 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Bankruptcy Law's Efftct]; Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: 
Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REv. 134 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict]; Note, Bankruptcy Law-Labor Law-Rejection of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements as Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 165 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements]; Comment, The 
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and litigated12 issue. The Court's test permitted rejection of the labor con-
tract if the bankruptcy court found the agreement burdensome to the 
debtor, and if, after "careful scrutiny," the equities balanced in favor of 
disaffirmance.18 The section S(d) violation that otherwise would occur 
under the NLRA was excused. a 
The second step sought by the debtor, the reduction of wages and bene-
fits, presents a separate problem. The duty to bargain in section 8(a)(5)111 
is the cornerstone of the Labor Act; the encouragement of the collective 
bargaining process is the ultimate goal of the legislation. This obligation 
requires the employer to bargain with her employees' representative about 
any changes in employment terms, whether or not an enforceable labor 
contract exists. By unilaterally decreasing wage rates, the debtor thus 
commits a second violation of the Act, even if the mid-term modification 
of the collective bargaining agreement is permitted by the court's approval 
of rejection. In considering the debtor's duty to bargain about wage and 
benefit reductions in Bildisco, the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge 
the existence of this distinct Labor Act violation which is unrelated to the 
rejection issue. The Court authorized Bildisco to change employment 
terms without mandatory bargaining from the time it filed for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11, even prior to the rejection approval by the bank-
ruptcy court. 
The decision prompted almost immediate legislative response.16 Con-
gress amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide a standard procedure for 
the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.17 Before seeking rejec-
tion, the debtor must propose to the union contract modifications "neces-
sary to permit the reorganization," and she subsequently must "confer in 
good faith" to discuss the suggested changes.18 The alteration of employ-
ment terms before rejection approval, allowed by the Bildisco Court, is 
now unlawfuJ.l9 
Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Rejection and Its Consequences, 36 ARK. L. REv. 
469 (1983); Comment, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Bankruptcy Reform Act: What 
Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use in Deciding Whether to Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement7, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 862 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, What Test 
Should the Bankruptcy Court Use). 
12. See cases cited infra notes 62-63. 
13. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. 
14. Id. at 1199-200. 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(S) (1982). 
16. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985). A bankruptcy court in Pittsburgh recently approved 
the first rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under the new legislation. See In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), ajj'd, 120 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2198 (W.D. Pa. 1985). 
18. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b). See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
19. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(£). See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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Legislation now controls this much debated20 issue of collective bargain-
ing agreement rejection. The second step that occurs after rejection-the 
reduction of employee wages and benefits-remains an open question, 
however. Both Bildisco and the legislation left unresolved the extent and 
nature of the debtor's duty to bargain after contract rejection or where no 
agreement is in effect when the Chapter 11 petition is filed. The superfi-
cial answer found in Bildisco, consistent with prior authority, suggests 
that the bargaining requirement remains intact and is unaffected by the 
bankruptcy proceedings. In the absence of a labor contract, the debtor 
must negotiate about alterations in employment terms until either agree-
ment or impasse is reached. Yet the Bildisco Court also allowed an em-
ployer bound by a labor contract to change employment conditions with-
out prior bargaining, a per se unfair labor practice in any other context. 21 
The two positions illogically permit the Chapter 11 employer with a col-
lective bargaining agreement more flexibility than the Chapter 11 em-
ployer who is not a party to a contract. 
Rationally defining the Chapter 11 employer's duty to bargain within 
the Bildisco framework proves impossible. Because the Court failed to ad-
dress the existence of two independent Labor Act violations in Bildisco's 
modification of its collective bargaining agreement and its reduction of 
wages and benefits, the Court also failed to acknowledge the significance 
of the duty to bargain as a separate issue unconnected to the contract. 
Determining the appropriate standard for the bargaining obligation in a 
Chapter 11 context requires a reevaluation of Bildisco in light of this 
oversight. Upon reconsideration, this Article concludes that Bildisco 
should have been required to bargain to impasse before implementing em-
ployee benefit cuts. 
On a more fundamental level, Bildisco signals a subde yet disturbing 
erosion of national labor policy. As a reflection of the Supreme Court's 
attitude toward the collective bargaining process, Bildisco envisions the 
labor-management relationship as one of distrust or, at best, toleration. 
Where collective bargaining threatens to "interfere" with the operation of 
the business, the Court excused the employer's obligation. Far from en-
couraging the cooperative and productive process contemplated by Con-
gress, the Bildisco Court viewed the bargaining relationship as one of ob-
struction and irreconcilable differences. By fostering such divisiveness, the 
Court threatens to undermine the goals of our labor laws. 
20. For two of the more extreme positions on this issue, see Pulliam, supra note 11 (arguing 
collective bargaining agreements should be treated same as other executory contracts, subject to rejec-
tion under "business judgment" test; see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text) and Bordewieck 
and Countryman, supra note 11 (arguing rejection of labor contracts should be approved only where 
reorganization will fail absent rejection). 
21. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43, 747 (1962). 
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Following analysis of the duty to bargain under the NLRA and of the 
special rights and obligations of a Chapter 11 employer, this Article 
briefly reviews the Bildisco decision and the legislation it prompted. The 
Article then considers the possible alternatives for defining the duty to 
bargain within the bankruptcy context. Because all options presented are 
inherently inconsistent with the Bildisco opinion, Bildisco is reevaluated 
and a standard that better accommodates the conflicting goals of the Labor 
Act and the Bankruptcy Code is proposed. Finally, the Article examines 
some of the more far-reaching implications for national labor policy of the 
Supreme Court's approach in Bildisco. 
I. THE STATUTORY TENSIONS AND ATTEMPTED RESOLUTIONS 
A. The Duty to Bargain Under the NLRA 
The duty to bargain lies at the heart of the National Labor Relations 
Act. The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized collective bargaining 
as the key to the industrial peace that the Act was created to promote.23 
The drafters of the NLRA considered the bargaining obligation such an 
inherent part of the Act's scheme that they thought it unnecessary to in-
clude an explicit bargaining provision in the legislation originally submit-
ted to Congress in 1935.u Section 8(5), the predecessor of the current 
section 8(a)(5),2" was added during deliberations to clarify the intent of 
Congress and to emphasize the necessary correlation between the em-
ployer's duty to recognize the employees' representative and the em-
ployer's obligation to negotiate with that representative.25 Without the 
duty to bargain, the employer's required recognition of the employees' 
representative is meaningless-a "mere delusion."28 
22. E.g., NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) ("The National Labor 
Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agree-
ments governing relations between unions and employers.") (footnote omitted); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 {1937) ("Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the 
recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own 
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. 
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife."). 
23. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 43 {1935) {statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 1373, 1419 (1949) [hereinafter cited as NLRA HIS-
TORY 1 ("[W1hile the bill does not state specifically the duty of an employer to recognize and bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees, because of the difficulty of setting forth this 
matter precisely in statutory language, such a duty is clearly implicit in the bill."); see NLRB v. 
American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402-03 {1952). 
24. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 8{5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 {1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(5) {1982)). 
25. SeeS. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 {1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HISTORY, supra 
note 23, at 2300, 2312. 
26. Id. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1960) (The "purpose [of§ 
8(a){5) 1 is the making effective of the duty of management to extend recognition to the union; the duty 
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Under section 8(a)(S), the employer commits an unfair labor practice 
by refusing to "bargain collectively', with her employees, chosen agent.27 
Section 8(d), added to the NLRA in 1947, defines the requirement to 
"bargain collectively,, as the obligation to "confer in good faith with re-
spect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.,,28 
Any unilateral alteration of a term of employment-a change made by the 
employer without negotiating with the union-clearly violates this bar-
gaining obligation and constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 
8(a)(5).29 
The Act recognizes, however, that there may be cases in which the par-
ties have negotiated in good faith but are unable to reach a mutually-
acceptable compromise. Having thus bargained to impasse, the employer 
is free to change employment conditions consistent with her ,last offer to 
of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to recognize the union."); 
see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively . . . promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other 
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining p(JCJ)er between employers and employ-
ees.") (emphasis added). 
27. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). A corresponding duty for labor organizations 
appears in § 8(b)(3) of the Act, 29 u.s.a. § t58(b)(3). 
28. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section B(d) states in relevant part: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either 
pany, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract 
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall 
also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the 
pany desiring such termination or modification-
(!) serves a written notice upon the other pany to the contract of the proposed termination 
or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract 
contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termina-
tion or modification; 
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new 
contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; 
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thiny days after such 
notice of the existence of a dispute • • .; and 
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms 
and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or 
until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later. 
The provision was added in its original form in 1947 (and was amended to the above-quoted form 
in 1974) in response to concerns that the Board had been improperly regulating bargaining behavior 
under § 8(a)(5). H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-24 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HIST6RY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ac:r, 1947, at 292, 310-12 
(1948) [hereinafter cited as LMRA HISTORY). 
29. The Supreme Coun characterized such action as a refusal to negotiate "in fact," which "frus-
trates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal." NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 
(1962). 
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the union. 30 The employer's "hands are tied" by the Act only until negoti-
ations have reached a stalemate.31 
Section B(d) imposes additional requirements on the employer where a 
collective bargaining agreement is in effect. During the term of the agree-
ment, either party may lawfully refuse to negotiate or even to discuss the 
alteration of any term covered by the contract.32 Absent voluntary agree-
ment, modifications can be made only after the contract's expiration.33 In 
particular, an employer who desires to terminate or modify a collective 
bargaining agreement must serve sixty days written notice of such intent 
and offer to discuss the proposed changes.34 Unilateral mid-term contract 
30. See id. at 745. While the Act imposes a duty to bargain over any subject considered a term or 
condition of employment, the statute is equally clear that this requirement includes no duty to agree. 
"[S]uch obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession .... " NLRA § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § !58( d). Factors considered by the Board in determining 
the existence of a lawful impasse include the parties' bargaining history, the parties' good faith, the 
length of negotiations, the significance of the issues about which the parties are unable to agree, and 
the understanding of each party as to the status of the negotiations. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 
N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). See generally Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L. 
REV. 769, 776-82 {1966) {exploring significance of impasse and factors considered in determining 
whether impasse reached). 
31. Absent a collective bargaining agreement, an employer may also alter an employment term 
without bargaining if a union waives its right to negotiate by failing to request bargaining after being 
notified of the intended change. See United States Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750 (1968). 
32. See Dunham-Bush, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1348 (1982); California Blowpipe & Steel Co., 
218 N.L.R.B. 736, 748 (1975) ("The Union .•. was not obligated to agree or even to discuss the 
Company's proposal which constituted a midterm modification of the collective-bargaining agreement 
.... "); Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 {1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 
{5th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 457 
(1966). A union, faced with an employer's demands for wage concessions to assist a failing business, 
may lawfully refuse even to meet with the employer if protected by a valid contract. See cases cited 
supra; infra note 65. The union may, of course, voluntarily agree to negotiations or contract modifi-
cations at any time. In recent years, such voluntary wage reductions have become common as unions 
have attempted to assist financially-troubled employers. See supra note 3. 
33. NLRA § S{d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4); Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185 (1971). 
Not every breach of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice under 
§ S(d), ho\vever. See Mine Workers v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Independent 
Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 1956). In considering 
amendments to the NLRA, Congress rejected provisions that would have made the violation of a 
collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice in and of itself. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § S(a)(S) (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 28, at 109-11. Section S(d) is 
applicable only where the contractual breach constitutes a "modification" or "termination" of the 
contract. The types of alterations generally at issue during Chapter 11 proceedings, i.e., wage and 
benefit reductions, unquestionably qualify as "modifications." "[T]here can be Iitle [sic] doubt that 
where an employer unilaterally effects a change which has a continuing impact on a basic term or 
condition of employment, wages for example, more is involved than just a simple default in a contrac-
tual obligation. Such a change manifestly constitutes a 'modification' within the meaning of Section 
S(d)." C & S Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 458 (1966). 
The duty to bargain during the term of a contract may continue, however, with respect to any 
mandatory subjects not covered in the collective bargaining agreement or discussed in prior negotia-
tions. See NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1952); GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 
240 N.L.R.B. 297, 298 (1979). 
34. NLRA § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The employer is also required to notify appropriate fed-
eral and state mediation authorities of the dispute within thirty days. Id. 
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modifications are prohibited by the requirement that all terms of the ex-
isting agreement continue in effect until the contract expires or the sixty 
day notice period has run, whichever is later. Given the significance of 
collective bargaining in the NLRA's underlying policies and goals,315 the 
additional restrictions and protection afforded any resulting agreement are 
both reasonable and appropriate. 
Thus, for a failing business, the avoidance of a collective bargaining 
agreement and a change in employment conditions without negotiation 
will result in two separate violations of section 8(a)(5). The first unfair 
labor practice is the modification of a term or condition of employment 
contained in a labor contract without compliance with section 8(d).36 The 
second violation, the unilateral change in a mandatory bargaining subject, 
constitutes an unfair labor practice regardless of the existence of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 37 
B. The Chapter 11 Employer 
By filing a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, an employer, in exchange for protection from her creditors, 
places her business under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. 38 The 
Chapter 11 proceeding allows the company an opportunity to restructure 
its debts and reorganize its business to become a profitable enterprise.39 
The business generally remains in operation under the direction of the 
bankruptcy court.40 Although the court may appoint an independent agent 
35. See Hearings on S. 1958 Bifore the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 34-43 {1935) {statement of Sen. Wagner giving overview of bill), reprinted in 1 NLRA HIS-
TORY, supra note 23, at 1410-19; see also the preamble of the Act, NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 
(1982). 
36. See, e.g., Dunham-Bush, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1348 {1982) (employer unilaterally 
changed contractual work rules); Foodway, 235 N.L.R.B. 1479, 1488 {1978) (employer refused to 
comply with enforceable labor contract); Airport Limousine Serv., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 933 (1977) 
(refusal to guarantee overtime and pay wage increase as required by labor contract); Fairfield Nurs-
ing Home, 228 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1210-11 (1977) (employer failed to pay contractual w-age increase); 
California Blowpipe & Steel Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 736, 748 (1975) (failure to comply with union secur-
ity clause); Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 {1973), enforud, 505 F.2d 1302 
{5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 {1975). When the contractual dispute is subject to griev-
ance/arbitration procedures contained in the agreement, the Board will defer to the arbitration process 
where certain safeguards have been met to ensure that the unfair labor practice issue has been consid-
ered by the arbitrator. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 {1984) (deferral to the parties' arbitration 
process before the arbitration has occurred); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) 
(same); United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 {1984) {deferral where an arbitration award 
has already been rendered); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 {1955) (same). 
37. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43, 747 (1962). 
38. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-74 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). 
39. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 {1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179 ("The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation 
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees 
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders."). 
40. ld. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 {1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
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as the trustee of the debtor-employer,41 the debtor herself usually contin-
ues to manage the business as the "debtor-in-possession."'2 
The Bankruptcy Code offers the debtor a variety of special protections 
and privileges designed to provide the business with a "breathing space" 
and a chance for rehabilitation. From the moment the petition is filed, the 
Code's automatic stay provision prohibits collection efforts by creditors," 
thus avoiding piecemeal liquidation of company assets which could irrepa-
rably cripple the enterprise. The creditors, and the judicial system, also 
benefit from the assurance that the division of those assets will not be 
determined by a race to the courthouse, rewarding those creditors who 
litigate their claims first." 
In conjunction with the automatic stay, the Code encourages creditors 
to continue dealing with the debtor in order to make possible the mainte-
nance of business operations. Any costs incurred in the ordinary course of 
business during reorganization are considered administrative expenses en-
titled to first priority in the payment of claims against the debtor."~ By 
extending further credit to the debtor, the creditor can assist the rehabili-
tation effort with the security that these additional debts must be paid 
before other priority claims or the claims of unsecured creditors.'6 The 
Bankruptcy Code also affords special protection to employees, who are 
uniquely dependent on the debtor. Wages earned during the reorganiza-
tion also must be paid as first priority administrative expenses.'7 
In addition to the problems of meeting the payroll and obtaining new 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6360. 
41. See 11 u.s.a. §§ 1104, 1108. 
42. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107. Except under certain specified circumstances, § 1107(a) 
grants to the debtor-in-possession the same rights, duties, and functions as a trustee. The tenns 
"debtor-in-possession" and "trustee" will therefore be used interchangeably in this Article. 
43. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984). Relief from the automatic stay is available 
under certain circumstances described in 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d). 
44. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. ConE 
CONG. & 'An. NEWS 5963, 6296-97: 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy 
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reor-
ganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into 
bankruptcy. 
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be 
able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would 
obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. 
45. 11 u.s.a. § S07(a)(1) (1982). 
46. Should this incentive prove inadequate, the bankruptcy court may authorize even more attrac-
tive alternatives under the statute to secure the extension of additional credit during the reorganization 
period. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1982). 
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(1) (1982). Unpaid wages, vacation pay, sick pay, and 
severance pay earned up to 90 days before the petition was filed are third priority claims. 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 507(a)(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). A maximum of $2,000.00 per employee is allowed. Benefits 
earned before the 90 day period are unsecured claims. Employee benefit plan contributions accrued 
within 180 days of filing are given fourth priority. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(4). 
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and extended credit, the debtor is often plagued by difficulties in meeting 
her obligations under ongoing contracts. The legislative history of the 
Code describes these "executory contracts" as agreements where "per-
formance remains due to some extent on both sides;"48 they include leases, 
continuing supply contracts and purchase agreements, and individual em-
ployment contracts.49 Under section 365(a) of the Code, the trustee or 
debtor-in-possession has the right to reject any executory contract with the 
approval of the bankruptcy court.150 The standard for rejection, generally 
referred to as the "business judgment" test, requires only that the debtor-
in-possession establish that the contract is burdensome to the company 
and the reorganization efforts.151 If the court approves the request for re-
jection, the contract is considered breached as of the time the petition was 
filed.152 The other party to the contract is reduced to the status of any 
other unsecured creditor and may then file a claim for contractual dam-
ages.153 This provision on executory contracts, as much as any other part 
of the Code, allows for the "breathing space" needed for a company to re-
establish itself. 
C. Tensions and Responses 
The ability to reject burdensome or unprofitable contracts is obviously 
one of the most significant privileges granted the debtor by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. That power, however, conflicts with the provisions of the 
NLRA prohibiting mid-term modifications of collective bargaining agree-
ments. A labor contract certainly fits within the broad definition of an 
executory contract. While under a collective bargaining agreement, both 
the union and the employer have continuing obligations to the other party. 
48. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. ConE CoNG. 
& An. NEWS 5963, 6303; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CoNG. ConE & An. NEws 5787, 5844; see Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 
57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) (defining executory contract as "a contract under which the 
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the 
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance 
of the other."); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
Countryman, supra); In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Jenson v. 
Continental Financial Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 1979) (same). 
49. See generally Countryman, supra note 48, at 450-60 (1973) (citing cases finding various 
contracts to be executory). 
so. 11 u.s.a. § 36S(a) (1982). 
51. See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milw., St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 
552-55 (1943) (considering whether rejection equitable to debtor); Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermar-
kets, Inc., 706 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1983) (describing the business judgment test as considering 
"only •.• whether rejection would be advantageous to the debtor"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 
(1983); 2 CoLUER ON BANKRUPTCY § 365.03 (15th ed. 1985). 
52. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198; Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Boback Corp., 541 
F.2d 312, 321 n.15 (2d Cir. 1976); 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1). 
53. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (interpreting 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 502(g), 507 (West 1979 & 
Supp. 1985)). 
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The Code contains nothing to suggest that collective bargaining agree-
ments under the NLRA should be treated any differently than other exec-
utory contracts. u 
Courts presented with the issue have unanimously held that collective 
bargaining agreements are "executory contracts" within the meaning of 
the Code. GG Yet because of the special status of labor agreements under the 
Labor Act, the courts have been unwilling to accept the business judgment 
test as the appropriate standard for rejection. Every appellate court that 
has considered the question, and ultimately the Supreme Court, have 
agreed that a labor contract "is not an ordinary contract"G6 to be treated 
in an ordinary way.G7 A collective bargaining agreement applies to a 
unique relationship of interdependence between employees and the com-
pany that employs them. The agreement creates a blueprint that guides 
the day-to-day dealings of the parties. This contractual "law of the shop," 
as described by the Supreme Court,G8 is critical to maintaining industrial 
peace in an ongoing relationship that is both constant and fluid. When 
most executory contracts are rejected, the relationship itself can be termi-
nated. Goods can be bought and sold through other more profitable ar-
rangements. When a collective bargaining agreement is rejected, however, 
the parties' underlying relationship remains unchanged. The employees 
continue as employees, the union continues as their representative, and the 
employer remains obligated to deal with that agent; only the contractual 
structure of the relationship has been removed. 
While a debtor's other executory contracts may be protected by the 
common law of contracts, a federal statute protects collective bargaining 
agreements. Treating a labor contract like any other contract ignores 
NLRA policies established by Congress, the same body that created the 
Bankruptcy Code. The Code does not permit the debtor to avoid its Labor 
54. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982) (executory contracts). 
55. See cases cited infra notes 62-63. 
56. John Wiley & Sons., Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). 
57. See infra notes 62-63; see also cases cited in Comment, What Test Should the Bankruptcy 
Court Use, supra note 11, at 866 n.29. But see In re Ateco Equipment, Inc., 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding standard of rejection for labor agreements should be same as for nonlabor 
executory contracts); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (ap-
plying business judgment rule). Cf In re Rath Packing Co., 36 Bankr. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) 
(describing as "very persuasive" arguments that business judgment test should be applicable to labor 
contracts but finding rejection appropriate under any of various standards applied). 
The Code does exempt from rejection labor agreements under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-88 (1982). See 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). Employers, and at least one commentator, have 
argued that the omission of a similar provision for contracts under the NLRA must be interpreted as 
a rejection by Congress of any special treatment for NLRA agreements. See Shopmen's Local Union 
455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1975); Pulliam, supra note 11, at 38: see also 
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (suggesting omission signifies not all collective bargaining agreements 
immune from rejection). 
58. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
u.s. 574, 578-79 (1960). 
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Act obligations "any more than it can ignore those imposed by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code."159 Where a direct conflict occurs, as between section 
365 of the Code allowing contract rejection and sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) 
of the NLRA prohibiting mid-term modification of a labor agreement, 
some accommodation must be made acknowledging the policies underlying 
both federal laws.60 
The appellate courts considering the rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements prior to Bildisco agreed that a standard somewhat stricter 
than the business judgment test was appropriate. 61 Disagreement arose, 
however, over the nature of that standard, prompting the Supreme Court 
to consider the problem. One line of cases required the debtor-in-
possession to establish that the reorganization would fail absent rejec-
tion. 62 An opposing, less stringent viewpoint involved a careful balancing 
of the equities weighing for and against rejection.63 The Bildisco Court 
eventually adopted the latter approach.u 
The rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, however, unlike the 
rejection of other types of executory contracts, cannot be viewed as an end 
in itself. The goal of the debtor-in-possession is not only to avoid the labor 
contract, but also to change the terms of employment for her workforce. 
The point is not to terminate her employees, but to have them continue 
working for reduced wages and benefits. The rejection of the labor con-
tract thus accomplishes only the first step of the employer's goal. Given 
the employer's duty under the NLRA to bargain about any change in 
employment conditions, the second step of actually making such changes 
raises a new issue and poses an obstacle independent of the contract rejec-
tion itself. This second problem is one traditionally handled by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. 
59. Shopmen's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975). 
60. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197; In rt Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 897-99 (11th 
Cir. 1983); Shopmen's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975). 
61. See appellate cases cited infra notes 62-63. 
62. Brotherhood. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); In rt Connecticut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847, 
2851-53 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In rt Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In 
rt Studio Eight Lighting, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429, 2430 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see Bildisco, 104 
S. Ct. at 1195; see also Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local 807 (Bohack II), 431 F. Supp. 646 
(E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978) (per-
mitting rejection where alternative was collapse of the business). 
63. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 898-99 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 
F.2d 72, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). An earlier Second Circuit case, 
Shopmen's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), also adopted the 
balancing approach. Only a few months later, however, the Second Circuit "interpreted" Kevin Steel 
as requiring that rejection be necessary to the success of the reorganization. See Brotherhood of Ry., 
Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 
(1975). For a discussion of this apparent discrepancy, see In re Brada Miiler, 702 F.2d at 898-99; In 
re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79-80. 
64. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. 
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In spite of the special circumstances of a Chapter 11 employer under 
bankruptcy court control, the Board generally has held the trustee or the 
debtor-in-possession to the same Labor Act obligations as any other em-
ployer.65 As the "alter ego" of the debtor-employer, the trustee or debtor-
in-possession is considered the same entity as the debtor-employer and 
therefore is treated as such under the NLRA.66 Under this theory, the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession assumes all bargaining obligations of the 
debtor-employer and is bound by any labor contract in effect. 67 If the 
bankruptcy court approved the rejection of a labor contract, the Board 
held the trustee or debtor-in-possession to a continuing duty to bargain.68 
After rejection the Board required the Chapter 11 employer to fulfill the 
same collective bargaining obligations as any employer whose employees 
are represented by a union but not covered by an agreement. Changes in 
employment terms were permitted only by union agreement or bargaining 
to impasse. 
The federal courts have consistently agreed with the Board, recognizing 
the duty to bargain after rejection under both the current69 Bankruptcy 
65. The Board has consistently rejected financial difficulties as a defense to a section 8(a)(5) 
charge based on the employer's unilateral change in a mandatory bargaining issue. Airport Limousine 
Serv., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 (1977); Phoenix Air Conditioning, 231 N.L.R.B. 341, 342 (1977), 
enforced, 580 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1978); Oak Cliff-Golman Banking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 
(1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); C & S Indus., 
158 N.L.R.B. 454, 460 (1966). 
66. See, e.g., Burgmeyer Bros., 254 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1028 (1981); Oxford Structures, Ltd., 245 
N.L.R.B. 1180, 1181 (1979); Jersey Juniors, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 329, 331-32 (1977); Cagle's, Inc., 
218 N.L.R.B. 603, 604 (1975); Stateside Shipyard & Marina, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 516, 518 (1969). 
Factors considered by the Board in concluding that an entity represents the alter ego of the employer 
include "'substantially identical' management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, 
and supervision, as well as ownership." Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1144 (1976). 
But see Blazer Indus., 236 N.L.R.B. 103, 109-10 (1978) (trustee was not bound by collective bar-
gaining agreement because of drastic changes in operation). 
67. See cases cited supra note 66. A unilateral change in employment terms would thus constitute 
a § 8(a)(5) violation even for the Chapter 11 employer. If the change also altered the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the employer would be guilty of an additional unfair labor practice 
under § 8(a)(5) by the violation of the provisions of§ 8(d)(4). NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) 
(West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See cases cited supra note 33. 
68. Oxford Structures, Ltd., 245 N.L.R.B. 1180, 1183 (1979) ("Although under some authorities 
a bankruptcy court may, after weighing all policy considerations, disaffirm an existing collective-
bargaining agreement, there is no authority for the proposition that the underlying bargaining obliga-
tion of an employer may be vitiated. Indeed, the opposite is true. A debtor-in-possession remains 
obligated to bargain if it continues to operate the same 'employing enterprise.'"); M&M Transp. Co., 
239 N.L.R.B. 73, 75 (1978) ("[A]s a general proposition of law, a debtor-in-possession, like any other 
employer, is obligated to bargain in good faith with the representative of his employees."); U.S. Lin-
gerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 763 (1968) ("[I]nstitution of bankruptcy proceedings does not extin-
guish preexisting bargaining obligations."). 
69. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982). See, e.g., In re Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d 890, 899 
(11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] debtor-in-possession, even after rejection, is compelled to bargain with an 
established bargaining unit in an attempt to execute a new collective bargaining agreement. . • . "); 
Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 80 ("[T]he debtor-in-possession who rejects a collective bargaining agreement 
remains an employer and is still required by the NLRA to bargain with the representatives of its 
employees .... "); Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1980) 
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Code and its predecessor.70 It is this duty to bargain after rejection, an 
issue which seemingly had been settled, that Bildisco unnecessarily mud-
dled. Although the Bildisco Court acknowledged the existence of some 
type of continuing bargaining obligation in Chapter 11 situations, the re-
quirement of bargaining to impasse is no longer clear. 
1. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco 
Bildisco and Bildisco, a New Jersey partnership, was in the business of 
distributing building supplies. Its warehousemen and drivers, represented 
by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, were covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement effective from May 1, 1979 to April 30, 1982.71 In January 
1980, without prior bargaining with the Teamsters, Bildisco breached the 
labor contract by failing to make pension, health, and welfare contribu-
tions, by failing to remit to the union dues withheld from employee 
paychecks, and by failing to pay vacation benefits.72 Three months later, 
on April 14, 1980, the company filed a petition for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 73 Bildisco continued operations as 
debtor-in-possession.74 Subsequent to the petition filing on May 1, 1980, 
Bildisco again violated the collective bargaining agreement and unilater-
ally altered employment terms by failing to pay a contractual wage 
increase.711 
("[W]e agree that a receiver has the general duty to bargain and otherwise comply with the NLRA 
.... "). 
The discussion of the duty to bargain in these cases is generally limited to one sentence. No expla-
nation of the nature or extent of the bargaining obligation is provided. Nonetheless, the courts almost 
certainly were referring to the duty to bargain to impasse; "duty to bargain" is a "term of art" in 
labor law and is understood to include the concept of "impasse" unless explicitly qualified. See NLRB 
v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). The courts' 
failure to elaborate more fully on the debtor-in-possession's continuing duty to bargain is not surpris-
ing; the issue was peripheral to the more immediate question before the courts-the rejection of the 
collective bargaining agreement. Apart from the consideration of rejection, the debtor-in-possession's 
failure to bargain was generally resolved through unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board. 
See infra note 187. 
70. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 320 (2d Cir. 1976), 
a.fj'd per curiam after remand, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); 
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 704 
(2d Cir. 1975). Again, the courts simply refer to the continuing duty to bargain without discussion, 
and it must be assumed that "impasse" bargaining was intended. See supra note 69. 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982), replaced the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976) (repealed 1978). Although a number of alterations 
were made, the basic structure and procedures remained unchanged. 
71. Bildisco & Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1204 (1981). 
72. ld. at 1204-05. 
73. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1192. 
74. Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. at 1204. 
75. ld. at 1205. 
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The Teamsters filed unfair labor practice charges against Bildisco in 
the summer of 1980. The Board issued an amended complaint on October 
8, 1980, charging violations of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 
Following Bildisco's failure to file a timely answer to the complaint, the 
Board granted the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment on 
April 23, 1981.76 On January 15, 1981, after the issuance of the com-
plaint but before the grant of summary judgment, Bildisco successfully 
requested rejection of the Teamster contract in the bankruptcy court.77 
The union's appeal from the order allowing rejection was consolidated by 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with the Board's petition for 
enforcement of its order.78 
The Third Circuit first considered Bildisco's request to reject its collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the Teamsters. Adopting the approach of 
a Second Circuit decision, the court concluded that the competing policies 
of the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA could best be accommodated by a 
"'thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both 
sides."'79 The Third Circuit then turned to the Board's findings of unfair 
labor practices. Because the court considered the debtor-in-possession to 
be a "new entity," it was not a "party" to the collective bargaining agree-
ment and thus could not have breached the contract.80 Although the court 
noted that the duty to bargain continued, the decision offered no further 
discussion of the nature or extent of this obligation.81 The court denied 
the Board's application for enforcement of its order. 
In considering Bildisco's failure to make pension contributions and pay 
a contractually-required wage increase, the Third Circuit neglected to rec-
ognize the existence of two separate unfair labor practices. The first un-
fair labor practice, the mid-term modification of the parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement, was rejected because Bildisco was not a "party" to the 
contract as the debtor-in-possession.82 The second unfair labor practice, 
overlooked by the Third Circuit, was Bildisco's alteration of employment 
terms without bargaining with the union, regardless of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Even though the court acknowledged that the duty to 
76. Id. at 1203-04. 
77. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 1982). 
78. Id. at 76. 
79. Id. at 79 (quoting Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 707 
(2d Cir. 1975), which in turn quotes In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 
1965)). The Third Circuit rejected, however, the subsequent ''interpretation" of Kroin Steel by the 
Second Circuit in Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79. See supra notes 61-64 and 
accompanying text. 
80. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 82-83. 
81. Id. at 83. 
82. Id. 
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bargain continued, it failed to explain how, consistent with this duty, 
Bildisco could unilaterally change the terms of employment. 83 In other 
words, the Third Circuit resolved only the section 8(a)(5) violation based 
on the collective bargaining agreement. The second violation of section 
8(a)(S), altering conditions of employment without first bargaining to im-
passe, was independent of the contract and ignored by the Court. 
The Supreme Court, in upholding the conclusions of the Third Circuit, 
repeated the mistake of the lower court by failing to distinguish between 
Bildisco's two separate section 8(a)(5) violations. The Court quickly dis-
missed the argument that collective bargaining agreements are not subject 
to rejection under Chapter 11 and proceeded to discuss the appropriate 
standard for permitting such rejection. 84 The Court agreed with the Third 
Circuit that the stricter standard used by some courts placed too high a 
burden on the struggling debtor. Adopting a slightly modified version of 
the Third Circuit's test, the Court held that rejection should be permitted 
if the labor contract burdens the company and if careful scrutiny reveals 
that the equities balance in favor of rejection.85 
Having resolved the rejection issue, the Court went on to address the 
Board's findings of unfair labor practices based on Bildisco's unilateral 
modifications of the contract.88 The Court wisely avoided the "new en-
tity" theory used by the Third Circuit and acknowledged that the debtor-
in-possession is more reasonably viewed as the same "entity" that existed 
before filing.87 Nonetheless, the Court reached the same result by a differ-
ent route. Instead of excusing Bildisco from the section 8(d) requirements 
as a new entity, the Court focused on the status of a labor contract after a 
bankruptcy petition is filed. Because the agreement is subject to rejection, 
the Court reasoned, it cannot be considered an "enforceable contract" 
under section 8(d) until assumed by the debtor-in-possession.88 Therefore, 
Bildisco's unilateral breach of the agreement did not constitute an unfair 
labor practice under the language of the NLRA. 89 
83. ld. 
84. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95. The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the "business 
judgment" rule, usually applied to executory contracts, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text, 
was inappropriate for labor contracts. ld. at 1195. 
85. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. 
86. ld. at 1197. 
87. Id. The "new entity" approach, first introduced by the Second Circuit in Shopmen's Local 
Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), had been the subject of substantial 
criticism. See infra note 141. 
88. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198-99. 
89. ld. at 1199-1201. In discussing the appropriate standard for rejection of a labor contract in 
Part II of the opinion, the Court had stated that "reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modifica-
tion" should be required by the bankruptcy court before approving rejection. ld. at 1196. Part III of 
the opinion, concerning the right of the debtor-in-possession to alter employment terms unilaterally, 
mentions no parallel bargaining requirement as a precondition of making these changes. The Court's 
"impasse" discussion in Part III, addressing the union's argument that the debtor-in-possession must 
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The Bildisco Court conceded that the filing for bankruptcy did not en-
tirely remove the bargaining obligation. Before rejection, the debtor-in-
possession must make "reasonable efforts" to negotiate voluntary contract 
modification~.9° Furthermore, the debtor-in-possession remains under a 
duty to bargain for a new contract, pending rejection of the old agreement 
or following rejection approval by the bankruptcy court. 91 The nature and 
extent of this duty to bargain, however, was left unresolved. 
Although the Court was unanimous in approving a balancing test for 
the rejection of collective bargaining agreements,92 it split over the debtor-
in-possession's obligation to comply with section 8(d) before rejection. 
Four Justices dissented from the majority's conclusion that Bildisco acted 
lawfully in unilaterally altering contract terms prior to rejection.93 Justice 
Brennan's dissenting opinion charged the majority with failing to accom-
modate the policies of the conflicting statutes, and with focusing instead 
on the Bankruptcy Code alone.94 Justice Brennan disputed the Court's 
holding that a collective bargaining agreement is not an "enforceable con-
tract" under section S(d) after a Chapter 11 petition is filed. The dissent 
argued that even though the contract is "suspended" before affirmance or 
rejection, it retains characteristics of a contract still "in effect. "95 Justice 
Brennan pointed out that, under traditional bankruptcy law, an executory 
contract is deemed enforceable from the commencement of the bankruptcy 
proceedings once it has been assumed by the debtor-in-possession. Even if 
rejected, Justice Brennan noted, the agreement is the basis under the Code 
for damage claims resulting from the breach. 96 
bargain to impasse before seeking rejection, more reasonably belongs in Part II of the decision. 
90. Id. at 1196. 
91. ld. at 1201. 
92. Id. at 1201 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
93. I d. at 1201 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) Qustice Brennan's partial dissent was joined by 
Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall, and Justice White.). 
94. Id. at 1204 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). 
95. Since the term "enforceable contract" cannot be found in § S(d), Justice Brennan assumed the 
majority was referring to the "in effect" language of that provision. I d. at 1206 (Brennan, J ., dissent-
ing in pan). 
96. I d. The dissent also noted that the contract rate is often used as a measure when determining 
the reasonable value of employee services rendered between the filing and a ruling on the contract's 
rejection. Id. at 1207. Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted the debtor-in-possession is an "employer" 
as defined in the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). Id. at 1207 & n.15. 
The dissenters found additional support for the applicability of § S(d) by examining the NLRA's 
underlying policies. The notice and cooling-off provisions of the statute were aimed at preventing the 
industrial strife that can result from unilateral mid-term contract modification. Id. at 1207-08 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting in part). Instead of assisting the debtor in reorganization, the labor unrest resulting 
from the unilateral breach of the collective bargaining agreement could actually hinder the debtor's 
efforts. If the agreement is so burdensome as to require immediate modification, reasoned Justice 
Brennan, the debtor-in-possession is free to request quick relief from the bankruptcy court. Id. at 
1209 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). 
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2. The Bildisco Legislation 
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco, Congress was 
considering amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to resolve the constitu-
tional status of bankruptcy judges. 97 In response to immediate and inten-
sive union lobbying,98 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Amendments 
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 to include a procedure for the rejec-
tion of collective bargaining agreements.99 Under the Code provisions as 
amended, a trustee or debtor-in-possession may not seek contract rejection 
unless she has: 1) proposed modifications to the union "necessary" to per-
mit a successful reorganization; and 2) provided the union with informa-
tion needed to evaluate those modifications.100 Until the hearing on rejec-
tion, the trustee must "confer in good faith" with the union in an effort to 
reach agreement.101 Absent a voluntary compromise, rejection will be ap-
97. In 1982, the Supreme Court held the Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional on the grounds that 
bankruptcy judges exercised judicial power without the protection of life tenure and the prohibition of 
salary diminution required by Article III of the Constitution. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Court stayed the ruling in order to allow Congress an 
opportunity to correct the problem without the confusion that would result from declaring the Code 
invalid. /d. at 88. The Bildisco legislation is part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 1113, 98 Stat. 333, 390, intended to resolve the status of the 
bankruptcy judges. There is some speculation, however, that the amendments failed to resolve the 
constitutional problem addressed in Marathon Pipe Line, making the amended Code vulnerable to 
being declared unconstitutional for a second time. See Dahl, New Bankruptcy Law Causes Confusion 
Amid Claims It Is Unconstitutional, Wall St. J., July 13, 1984, at 3, col. 4. 
98. The immediate response of unions to Bildisco was undoubtedly responsible in part for the 
rapid enactment of legislation to alter its result. See, e.g., Serrin, Labor Leaders Voice Concern, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at D25, col. 4; Apcar, Unions Press Congress to Reverse Decision by High 
Court on Bankrupt Firms' Pacts, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1984, at 35, col. 4. The first legislation to 
reverse Bildisco was introduced by Representative Peter Rodino on the same day the decision was 
handed down. See H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1984). 
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985); see H.R. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 
(1984) (discussing reasons for amended provision). 
100. 
Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee ... shall 
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such 
agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of such 
proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and pro-
tections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all credi-
tors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and 
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with such 
relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1). 
The duty to supply information is not a new concept in labor relations. The employer's bargaining 
obligation under § 8(a)(S) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(S) (1982), has been interpreted as 
including a duty to supply relevant information to unions to permit them to bargain knowledgeably 
about terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1956). 
See generally R. GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 409-15 (1976) (discussing duty to furnish 
information); I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 606-29 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) (same). 
101. 
During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for in para-
graph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee 
shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in good faith in 
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proved if the union has failed to accept the debtor's proposal "without 
good cause" and if the equities "clearly" balance in favor of rejection.102 
In contrast with the Bildisco decision, the new statute does not permit 
the debtor-in-possession to alter any contract term unilaterally before 
complying with the specific procedures for rejection and before obtaining 
approval of the rejection from the bankruptcy court.103 In recognition of 
the employer's possible need for immediate relief, however, the legislation 
requires a hearing within fourteen days after application for rejection104 
and permits interim changes prior to rejection if approved by the court.1015 
Despite the fact that the legislation partially addressed the duty to bar-
gain before contract rejection, a number of questions remain. The newly 
revised Code requires the trustee to "confer in good faith"~06-language 
identical to that found in section 8(d)'s definition of the duty to bargain 
under the NLRA.107 Is Congress implying that the same duty to bargain 
to impasse under section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act is applicable to the 
trustee prior to rejection under the Code? The answer is almost certainly 
no, though it is unfortunate tha~ Congress did not select alternative lan-
guage. Although the legislative history is not entirely clear on the point, 
Congress apparently shared the concern of the Bildisco Court that the 
bankruptcy judges not be burdened by traditional Board determina-
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2). The term "trustee" as used in the legislation includes a debtor-in-
possession. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1). 
102. 
The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal [of "necessary" 
modifications); 
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such pro-
posal without good cause; and 
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c). 
103. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(1) ("No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to 
unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance 
with the provisions of this section."). Unilateral changes in the contract are permitted pending the 
court's ruling on rejection, however, if the judge fails to rule on the application for rejection within 
thirty days. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(2). 
104. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(1). 
105. 
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if essen-
tial to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the 
estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim 
changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with 
the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not render the 
application for rejection moot. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e). 
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2). 
107. NLRA § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). 
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tions.108 More significantly, the legislation fails to address the existence 
and extent of the debtor-in-possession's bargaining obligation after con-
tract rejection or contract expiration. In order to consider these issues, 
Bildisco must be reexamined. 
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CHAPTER 11 
The Bildisco Court, purportedly recognizing the importance of collec-
tive bargaining in national labor policy, held that bargaining was required 
both before and after contract rejection. Prior to seeking rejection, the 
Court stated, the debtor-in-possession must make "reasonable efforts to 
negotiate a voluntary modification."109 Even if such efforts fail, the 
debtor-in-possession remains obligated to bargain about a new contract 
108. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200. Senator Hatch, a member of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary and a Senate conferee on the Bildisco legislation, stated that the good faith obligation im-
posed by the statute was "a requirement articulated by the Supreme Court in the Bildisco case ..•• 
[T]he good faith nature of these negotiations will require that the employees' union representative be 
given an opportunity to review and accept or reject the business proposal." 130 CoNe. REc. S8892 
(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & An. 
NEWS 590, 593. If intended as a reflection of the Supreme Court's position, impasse was not contem-
plated. See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3281-82 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa.), ajj'd, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 2204 (W.D. Pa. 1985); cf. 130 CoNe. REC. S8888 
(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNe. & AD. 
NEWS 581, 583 ("The requirement that the union refusal to accept the proposal be 'without good 
cause' is obviously not intended to import traditional labor law concepts into a bankruptcy forum or 
tum the bankruptcy courts into a version of the National Labor Relations Board."). But see 130 
CoNe. REc. S8898, 8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("(T)he legislation 
. • • embodies the principles of the NLRA by requiring the company to bargain in good faith."). 
The legislation presents other obvious problems of interpretation as well. Section 1113(b)(1)(A), for 
example, requires the trustee to propose contract modifications "necessary" for the reorganization. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1)(A). Strictly interpreted, this provision could demand a demonstration by the 
trustee that the reorganization would fail without the requested changes in employment terms. An-
other interpretation might require only that the revisions contribute to a successful reorganization. See 
In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 2202 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("[T]he 
'necessary' standard of § 1113 does not mean 'absolutely essential;' .•. a 'necessary' standard (is) 
satisfied by considerations of feasibility for reorganization."). 
Similarly, § 1113(c) includes as a precondition for rejection the union's refusal of the trustee's 
proposed modifications "without good cause." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c)(2). "Good cause" may be subject 
to a number of possible definitions, depending on whether the provision is viewed as one for the 
protection of the trustee or the union. See 130 CoNe. REc. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoNe. & AD. NEWS 590, 591 ("[t)he union can only 
reject such a good faith offer for cause good enough to justify the risk of the business' collapse"). 
The legislative history suggests that the statute be interpreted liberally with concern for the debtor's 
financial well-being. See 130 CoNe. REC. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond), reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNe. & AD. NEws 581, 583 (commenting that provisions of 
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) should be interpreted "in the most practical and workable manner possible"); 
130 CoNe. REc. S8892 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CoDE CoNe. & An. NEWS 590, 592-94 ("all •.. provisions in this labor part of the bill must be 
read in the context of the needs of the reorganization process"). The first bankruptcy court decision 
approving the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under the new legislation indicates that 
the debtor's predicament will remain the primary concern under the statute. See In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 120 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2198 (W.D. Pa. 1985). 
109. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. 
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"pending rejection of the existing contract or following formal approval of 
rejection by the Bankruptcy Court."110 The Court was equally explicit, 
however, in rejecting any duty to bargain to impasse as a condition of 
seeking rejection.m Furthermore, the Court permitted the Chapter 11 
employer to make unilateral changes in employment terms prior to rejec-
tion without violating section 8(a)(5).112 
The question left unanswered is the extent of the bargaining obligation 
where no contract is in effect. Even though the Bildisco Court stated that 
the duty continues after rejection, it did not elaborate on the nature of that 
duty. Several theories are suggested by the Bildisco framework; none is 
satisfactory. The approach most likely to be accepted by the bankruptcy 
courts and the Board, consistent with past authority, reinstates the duty to 
bargain to impasse immediately after rejection of the labor contract by the 
bankruptcy court. Alternatively, the duty to bargain after rejection may be 
the same as the bargaining obligation before rejection, that is, a duty to 
bargain in good faith but not to impasse. As a third option, an analogy to 
successorship principles would suggest that the debtor-in-possession could 
lawfully make initial unilateral alterations in employment terms but 
thereafter would be required to bargain about any additional changes. 
Yet, because Bildisco is inherently inconsistent, each of these analyses 
fails: By permitting Bildisco to alter employment terms unilaterally before 
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, but requiring bargaining 
after rejection, the Court illogically allowed the debtor-in-possession with 
a labor contract more freedom than the Chapter 11 employer without an 
agreement. After examining these different approaches, this Article con-
cludes that the traditional concept of a duty to bargain to impasse must be 
imposed. This result can be reached, however, only by reevaluating and 
ultimately rejecting that aspect of the Bildisco decision. 
A. Bargaining to Impasse 
A superficial reading of the Bildisco majority opinion suggests that the 
"usual" section 8(a)(5) obligations take effect as soon as the bankruptcy 
court approves rejection of the labor contract. In other words, although 
the duty to bargain to impasse is excused prior to or as a condition of 
rejection, that duty remains with respect to any changes in employment 
terms made after rejection. Such changes would be permitted only if the 
union agreed or if the parties reached a lawful impasse. This approach, 
consistent with prior Board and appellate court decisions addressing the 
110. Id. at 1201. 
111. Id. at 1200. 
112. Id. at 1198-1201. 
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issue, 113 seems a reasonable interpretation of the Court's statement that 
the debtor-in-possession remains "obligated to bargain . . . over the terms 
and conditions of a possible new contract."114 
The difficulty with such a theory is that it puts the debtor-in-possession 
in a better posture, vis-a-vis her obligations under the NLRA, before re-
jection than after rejection. Prior to rejection, the debtor-in-possession ap-
parently can make whatever employment changes she desires without con-
sulting the union.1115 After rejection, she is restricted by a duty to bargain. 
National labor policy, as well as common sense, would dictate the reverse. 
A debtor-in-possession who is contractually bound to a union should be 
under -greater restrictions, even under Chapter 11, than the debtor-in-
possession whose contractual obligations have been removed. The policies 
of the NLRA, reflected in the increased protection afforded a union with 
a collective bargaining agreement, 116 have been more than "subordinated 
to the exigencies of bankruptcy"117-they have been completely subverted. 
The inconsistency created by this interpretation is further highlighted 
by considering the debtor-in-possession's duty to bargain when there is no 
collective bargaining agreement involved. The Bildisco Court, 118 as well 
as other courts presented with the issue, 119 stated that the duty to bargain 
remains after rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. Presumably, 
that same duty is in effect when there is no agreement, whether because 
one expired before the Chapter 11 filing or because the workers had never 
unionized before reorganization.120 No court has suggested otherwise, nor 
did the Bildisco legislation address this question. In the absence of a con-
tract, the debtor-in-possession would be allowed to alter employment 
terms, but only after bargaining to impasse.121 In contrast, according to 
the Supreme Court's reasoning, the debtor-in-possession subject to a col-
lective bargaining agreement could make unilateral contract changes prior 
to rejection without running afoul of section 8(a)(5).122 Again, contrary to 
sensible expectations, the Chapter 11 employer subject to a labor contract 
113. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
114. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201. 
115. See id. at 1198-99. Although the Court required some bargaining as a condition of allowing 
contract rejection, id. at 1196, the Court made no reference to any bargaining obligation as a neces-
sary prerequisite of Bildisco's right to make unilateral changes in employment terms, id. at 1197-99. 
Furthermore, the facts contain no indication that Bildisco discussed with the union its action in ceas-
ing pension contributions and failing to pay a contractual wage increase. See id. at 1192-93. 
116. The greater protection accorded labor contracts under the NLRA is evident in the § 8(d) 
restrictions. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 1973 & Supp. 1985). See supra notes 33-35 and accompa-
nying text. 
117. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1200. 
118. Id. at 1201. 
119. See cases cited supra notes 68-70. 
120. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. 
122. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198-99. 
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has greater flexibility in altering employment terms than the Chapter 11 
employer without such an agreement. Although there is unquestionably a 
conflict to be resolved here between the Bankruptcy Code and the Labor 
Act/23 it is impossible to justify the Court's subordination and reversal of 
NLRA policy in considering the bargaining obligation. 
B. Bargaining in Good Faith Without Impasse 
An attempt at consistency in evaluating the Court's opinion suggests 
that the duty to bargain after rejection may require a "good faith" effort 
on the part of the debtor-in-possession but no obligation to reach "im-
passe" before changing employment terms. This bargaining obligation 
would be the equivalent of the duty to bargain before rejection described 
in Bildisco.124 In other words, the debtor-in-possession would be required 
to bargain, but not to impasse, both before and after the contract's disaf-
firmance. Again, recognizing the special protection afforded collective bar-
gaining agreements under the NLRA 125 and by Bildisco itself, 126 the 
Chapter 11 employer logically should be permitted no less flexibility after 
rejection than before. The "breathing space" needed by the debtor-in-
possession, a factor which motivated the Bildisco Court/27 would presum-
ably be a continuing concern both before and after contract repudiation. 
Thus, after rejection the Chapter 11 employer would continue to bargain 
in good faith but could alter employment terms as needed without the 
necessity of reaching agreement or impasse. 
This analysis raises two problems. First, it runs counter to prior judi-
cial and Board decisions, all of which have consistently imposed a duty to 
bargain to impasse subsequent to the rejection of a labor agreement.128 It 
seems unlikely that the Bildisco Court would suggest the reversal of this 
relatively settled issue of law without more explicit discussion. Second, 
diluting the employer's duty to bargain by eliminating the requirement of 
impasse as a condition precedent to changes in employment terms unduly 
undermines the policies of the NLRA. The duty to bargain in "good 
faith" would have little content if the employer were also free to alter 
wages at will.129 The Supreme Court permitted this result pending rejec-
123. Id. at 1198-1201 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). 
124. Id. at 1196. 
125. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
126. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195 ("[B]ecause of the special nature of a collective-bargaining 
contract, and the consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates .•. a somewhat stricter standard 
should govern the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to allow rejection of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment") (citations omitted). 
127. Id. at 1199. 
128. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
129. The counter argument is that the union retains its ultimate economic weapon in striking. 
Courts considering the issue have generally agreed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 
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tion to allow the debtor-in-possession some immediate relief from the con-
tract. Once the constraints of the collective bargaining agreement have 
been removed, however, only a complete abandonment of all NLRA obli-
gations would justify this further release from all duties under section 
8(a)(5). Accommodation of both the Labor Act and the Bankruptcy Code 
unquestionably is required, but no court has suggested that the Act be-
comes meaningless upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. 
C. Bargaining to Impasse After Initial Unilateral Changes 
A final possible approach to defining the duty to bargain absent a labor 
contract involves the new entity theory used by the Third Circuit, but 
rejected by the Supreme Court, in Bildisco.130 Adopting the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis/31 the Third Circuit held that the debtor-in-possession was 
a "new entity" not bound by the debtor's collective bargaining agreement 
and subject only to the NLRA obligations of a "successor employer." The 
concept of "successor employer" in labor law generally refers to an inde-
pendent person or company that has purchased an ongoing business.132 
The purchaser may be deemed a successor employer if she continues oper-
ations essentially unchanged and hires enough of her predecessor's em-
ployees to constitute a majority of her workforce.133 Once successor status 
is established, the new employer must recognize and bargain with the rep-
resentative of the predecessor's employees as required by sections 8(a)(5) 
and 8(d) of the Labor Act.13' Unless she voluntarily assumes the agree-
101-115 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985), prohibiting federal courts from issuing injunctions against 
strikes involving "labor disputes," 29 U.S.C. § 104, bars a bankruptcy court from enjoining a labor 
strike against the debtor. See Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 80; Crowe & Assocs. v. Bricklayers & Masons 
Local 2 (In re Crowe & Assocs.), 713 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1983); Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 
317 (In re Petrusch), 667 F.2d 297, 298-300 (2d Cir. 1981}, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982); Local 
886, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Quick Charge, Inc., 168 F.2d 513,515-16 (10th Cir. 1948}; Anderson 
v. Bigelow, 130 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1942}. 
While the union retains the right to strike, it may be reluctant to exercise that power. The typical 
consequences of a strike, involving the slowing down or discontinuance of operations, could prove too 
great a burden for the financially-troubled debtor. A union may be unwilling to risk the possibility 
that the strike will ultimately eliminate the employees' jobs altogether should the business fail. See 
Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAl- L. REv. 477, 482 (1969). 
130. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 82-83; Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. 
131. See Shopmen's Local Union Number 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
132. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 695-756 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983} (discuss-
ing determination of successorship status and obligations of successor employer); Note, The Bargain-
ing Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975) (examining successor em-
ployer's duty to bargain). 
133. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262-64 (1974}; 
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972). The successorship doctrine also 
requires continuity of an appropriate bargaining unit. 406 U.S. at 281. 
134. Burns, 406 U.S. at 281. See also sources cited supra note 132. 
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ment, the successor is not bound to any labor contract of her predecessor 
since the successor was never a party to that agreement.135 
Prior to Bildisco, appellate courts invoked the new entity /successor the-
ory to avoid the modification restrictions for collective bargaining agree-
ments imposed by section S(d) of the Act. The Board and unions had 
argued that rejection of a labor contract by a bankruptcy court was im-
proper unless the debtor-in-possession first complied with section 
8(d)(1-4).136 By considering the debtor-in-possession a "new entity," 
however, the appellate courts adopting this approach reasoned that the 
debtor-in-possession was not a "party" to the contract and thus was unaf-
fected by section 8(d).137 
Courts had also relied on the successor theory to support a Chapter 11 
employer's right to alter employment terms unilaterally. A successor em-
• ployer generally may set initial terms of employment without prior con-
sultation with the union.138 A successor's bargaining obligation becomes 
effective only when the successor has hired a sufficient number of the 
predecessor's employees to constitute a majority of the successor's full 
workforce. 139 Before reaching that point in hiring, the new emplbyer has 
not yet become a "successor" and may lawfully establish or alter employ-
ment terms as she desires. By analogy, some courts had suggested that the 
debtor-in-possession, as a "new entity," could unilaterally alter wages or 
benefits upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition without violating section 
8(a)(5).14o 
The new entity /successor approach provoked substantial criticism141 
and was discarded by the Supreme Court in Bildisco. Recognizing the 
theory for the legal fiction it is, the Court concluded that it is more "sensi-
ble" to treat the debtor-in-possession as the same "entity" as the pre-
135. Burns, 406 U.S. at 281-84. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), carved 
out a limited exception to the general rule in Burns. The predecessor employer in Wiley, Interscience, 
merged into a much larger company, John Wiley & Sons. Interscience ceased to exist as a separate 
entity. Forty of Interscience's 80 employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Wi-
ley's 300 employees were unorganized. Under these unusual circumstances, involving the "disappear-
ance" of the predecessor by merger and the unchanged nature of the business, the Court required 
Wiley to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement signed by 
Interscience. I d. at 548. Wiley has been limited to its particular facts. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 285-86; 
Howard johnson, 417 U.S. at 256-59. 
136. See, e.g., Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d at 702-03. 
137. Id. at 704. 
138. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95. 
139. Id. at 294-95. 
140. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 170-71 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 {1975). 
141. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 894-95 (11th Cir. 1983); Bordewieck 
and Countryman, supra note 11, at 301-09; Note, Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 11, at 
137-42; Note, Bankruptcy Law's Effect, supra note 11, at 404; Note, Rejection of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, supra note 11, at 172-73. 
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petition employer.142 Yet only a few pages later in the opinion, the succes-
sor theory returns to haunt us. In support of its statement that the debtor-
in-possession is obligated to bargain about the terms of a new contract 
both pending and after rejection, the Bildisco Court cited one of the lead-
ing cases on the obligations of a successor employer, NLRB v. Burns Se-
curity Services.143 
The Court's reference to Burns may have been inadvertent. Given the 
Court's earlier dismissal of the successor theory/"" it seems unlikely that 
the Court would signify the adoption of the successor analogy simply by 
referring to Burns without further explanation. Perhaps the Burns cite 
was intended only as general authority for the proposition that the debtor-
in-possession has a continuing bargaining obligation even in the absence 
of an enforceable contract. Burns was not a bankruptcy case, however, 
and a number of more appropriate sources could have been used for such 
a reference.1411 The use of Burns therefore appears deliberate. Given the 
usual right of the successor employer to set initial terms and conditions of 
employment, 146 the Bildisco Court may have been suggesting that the 
Chapter 11 employer has the right to alter employment terms unilaterally 
immediately after rejection but thereafter must bargain to impasse con-
cerning any additional changes. 
The successor approach is more analytically sound than requiring bar-
gaining in good faith short of impasse. Allowing the debtor-in-possession 
initial flexibility in changing employment terms somewhat alleviates the 
problem of imposing more severe bargaining obligations on the employer 
without a contract than on an employer with a contract. Moreover, re-
quiring impasse bargaining after those initial changes aligns the Court's 
position more closely with that of prior courts considering the issue.147 
Finally, the underlying policies of the NLRA seem better balanced with 
the "breathing space" needed by the employer undergoing 
reorganization.148 
Ultimately, however, the successor analysis, like the first two attempts 
to reconcile the Bildisco opinion, proves untenable. As the Bildisco Court 
implicitly acknowledged, the successor theory entails an unconvincing le-
gal fiction. Although the debtor's business is subject to bankruptcy court 
supervision during Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor-in-possession is in 
fact the same person operating the same business as before the Chapter 11 
142. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. 
143. 406 U.S. 272 (1972), cited by Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201. 
144. See cases cited supra notes 69-71. 
145. See cases cited in Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196-97. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40. 
147. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
148. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199. 
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petition was filed.149 Treating the debtor-in-possession as an entirely new 
person for the sole purpose of avoiding certain obligations under the 
NLRA seems a strained manipulation of reality. As noted in Bildisco, if 
the debtor-in-possession were actually a new entity and not a party to the 
labor contract, requiring rejection of the collective bargaining agreement 
would be unnecessary and nonsensical.1150 
The successor theory also leads to the same inconsistency as the bargain 
to impasse approach in that it illogically permits an employer bound by a 
collective bargaining agreement greater freedom to make unilateral 
changes than an employer without a contract. The right of a debtor-in-
possession under the successor analogy to alter employment terms unilat-
erally after rejection provides only a "one shot" opportunity.1151 Any fu-
ture changes require union agreement or bargaining to impasse. Bildisco, 
by contrast, was permitted to alter employment terms without bargaining 
at various times prior to rejection of the collective bargaining 
agreement.1152 
Moreover, application of the successor analogy would provide an incen-
tive for the Chapter 11 employer to reduce wages and benefits more than 
warranted by the circumstances. Because initial changes in employment 
terms could be made without negotiation while subsequent changes would 
require bargaining to impasse, the debtor would be encouraged to make 
drastic initial cuts. A later negotiation of increases in benefits is always 
easier than the negotiation of further reductions. Larger initial cuts would 
further exacerbate the tense labor relations and charges of employer bad 
faith that often occur in Chapter 11 situations. If consistently required to 
bargain from the beginning, however, the employer may be more likely to 
reduce benefits in smaller increments, thereby increasing the potential for 
union agreement and cooperation. 
Finally, even accepting the successor analogy, it is not clear that succes-
sorship law itself would permit initial unilateral changes in these circum-
149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The "new entity" analysis is more persuasive 
where the business is being operated by a trustee rather than a debtor-in-possession. The Code makes 
clear, however, that the rights and responsibilities of the two are essentially identical, and there is no 
good justification for distinguishing them. See 11 U.S.C.A. §1107(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). 
Since the trustee steps into the shoes of the debtor, it is reasonable to attribute to the trustee the 
debtor's collective bargaining obligations. · 
150. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197; In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 895 (11th Cir. 
1983). Even the Second Circuit later acknowledged this inconsistency in its own theory. See Truck 
Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 320 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Of course, the statement that 
the debtor is not a 'party,' and the analogy to the successor employer, cannot be taken literally, since 
neither affirmance nor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would be possible by one not a 
party to it."). 
151. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
152. Bildisco ceased pension contributions in January, 1980, prior to filing a Chapter 11 petition 
in April, 1980. It also denied a contractual wage increase in May, 1980. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1192. 
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stances. The right of a successor employer to establish initial terms of 
employment is not absolute. In NLRB v. Burns Security Services, Inc./153 
the Supreme Court stated that a successor may be obligated to consult 
with the union about initial employment terms where it is "perfectly 
clear" that the employer intends to retain all of the employees as part of 
the same business.1154 The National Labor Relations Board has limited 
this requirement to circumstances where the successor employer explicitly 
or implicitly advises the predecessor employees that they will continue in 
their jobs with unchanged employment terms.11515 Even where the new em-
ployer intends to retain the entire workforce, she may unilaterally set ini-
tial employment terms if she makes her plans clear to the employees 
before hiring. Should she imply or advise the employees that business will 
continue "as usual," however, the successor may be required to bargain 
before any changes in her predecessor's wages and benefits are allowed.1156 
Where the debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 continues to operate 
what is in fact the same business, the replacement of existing employees 
with new employees is not an issue, unlike in the successor situation.1157 
153. 406 u.s. 272 (1972). 
154. I d. at 294-95 ("Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which 
it will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the 
new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to 
have him initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms."); see 
also NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1980) ("It is now well settled that where 
the employer retains all of the employees from his predecessor's bargaining unit, it is appropriate that 
he first consult with the collective bargaining agent before altering the terms and conditions of 
employment."). 
155. In Spruce-Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974), the Board limited the Burns language, 
supra note 154, to situations where "the new employer has either actively, or, by tacit inference, 
misled employees into believing they would all be retained without change in their wages, hours, or 
conditions of employment, or at least to circumstances where the new employer . . . has failed to 
clearly announce its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former employees to 
accept employment." Id. at 195 (footnote omitted); see Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 841, 
845-46 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977) (successor employer required to bargain 
about initial employment terms where he advised employees he wanted them to "stay on the job, and 
would carry on as usual"); Stewart Granite Enterprises, 255 N.L.R.B. 569, 575 n.27 (1981) (succes-
sor employer estopped from setting initial terms of employment by actions suggesting to predecessor 
employees that they would be retained at same wages). The Board was concerned in Spruce-Up that 
any other interpretation would encourage a new employer not to hire her predecessor's employees in 
order to avoid the bargaining obligation over initial terms of employment. The Board's restrictive 
interpretation permits a new employer lawfully to announce new terms of employment before hiring 
begins even if the successor subsequently hires her predecessor's entire work force. Spruce-Up, 209 
N.L.R.B. at 195. 
156. See Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 841, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 1040 (1977). 
157. Employees may anticipate work reduction and layoffs during reorganization, but the hiring 
of new employees under different terms of employment is rarely to be expected. Unlike in the succes-
sor situation, the employees clearly were not "hired" with the knowledge that their wages would be 
reduced. They likely were employees of the debtor long before the Chapter 11 petition was filed. 
The employees, of course, reasonably may contemplate wage and benefit reductions following court 
approval of the collective bargaining agreement. Perhaps such expectations are common from the 
initiation of Chapter 11 proceedings. This does not mean, however, that the employees expect such 
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Even if the debtor-in-possession is considered a successor employer, a per-
suasive argument can be made that the debtor-in-possession is barred 
from making initial unilateral changes under the Burns "perfectly clear" 
exception. Hence, the successor analogy is at best an uncomfortable and 
shaky basis for reconciling the policies of the Bankruptcy Code and the 
NLRA.1158 It is unlikely that the Court would adopt such a novel and 
questionable analysis without directly addressing the issue. 
D. Re-evaluating Bildisco and the Duty to Bargain 
The Bildisco Court has made it impossible to define rationally the bar-
gaining obligations of the Chapter 11 employer without a labor contract. 
Surely the employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement are en-
titled to equal or greater protection under the NLRA and the Bankruptcy 
Code than employees without one. Yet imposing a duty to bargain to im-
passe immediately after rejection creates, within the Bildisco framework, 
the contrary result. While employers not bound by labor contracts are 
required to bargain to impasse, those with agreements were permitted by 
the Court in Bildisco to make changes in employment terms unilaterally. 
The two potential alternative theories-excusing the duty to bargain to 
impasse entirely or permitting initial unilateral changes-must also be re-
jected as involving too radical a departure from accepted doctrine to be 
adopted absent explicit guidance from the Court. By allowing the Chapter 
11 employer bound by a contract the freedom to make unilateral changes 
in employment conditions, the Court has deprived employees protected by 
a collective bargaining agreement of any meaningful representative rights, 
and has created uncertainty as to the rights of employees who do not have 
a contract. 
The employer's duty to bargain represents the cornerstone of the 
NLRA, giving substance to the employees' right to organize and deal col-
lectively with their employer.1159 The Board and the courts have no power 
changes without their union's participation. 
158. In REA Express, the Second Circuit held the Bums exception inapplicable to the Chapter 
11 situation, reasoning that employees could not have been misled because the bankruptcy "was 
widely publicized" and "put the unions and REA employees on notice that changes would be required 
to avert collapse of REA." Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 
164, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). 
159. See 79 CoNG. REc. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HISToRY, supra note 23, at 2321, 
2336 ("[T]he right of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing 
must be matched by the correlative duty of employers to recognize and deal in good faith with these 
representatives. The Government itself is held up to ridicule when the elections which it supervises 
are rendered illusory by failure to acknowledge their results."); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
12 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HISTORY, supra note 23, at 2300, 2312 (employees' right to bar-
gain collectively is a "mere delusion" in absence of corresponding duty to bargain on part of em-
ployer); see also NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). 
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to mandate agreement; only bargaining is required.160 If the employer can 
avoid that obligation by filing a petition under Chapter 11, the union is 
virtually powerless to protect the employees' rights and benefits. The pur-
ported goal of accommodating the policies of the two statutes is rejected in 
favor of the complete elimination of employee bargaining rights.161 
The Bildisco Court specifically noted that after rejection of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the debtor-in-possession must bargain for a 
new contract under section S(a)(S) of the NLRA.162 There is no justifica-
tion for distinguishing between the debtor-in-possession who files a peti-
tion while not bound by a collective bargaining agreement and the debtor-
in-possession after rejection who is also without a labor contract. Both 
should be held to the same duty to bargain to impasse, including the usual 
section S(a)(S) prohibition on unilateral changes in employment terms.163 
In excusing the debtor-in-possession from the constraints of section S(d) 
and the duty to bargain to impasse, the Bildisco Court was apparently 
concerned with two issues. As an overriding consideration, the Court cited 
the "flexibility and breathing space" needed by the debtor-in-possession to 
restructure the business.164 Requiring adherence to section 8( d)( 1-4) of 
the NLRA, the Court stated, would have the practical effect of binding 
the debtor-in-possession to the terms of a contract that may hinder the 
company's rehabilitation.1615 As a secondary matter, the Court was reluc-
tant to require the bankruptcy courts to determine the existence of a law-
ful impasse, an issue traditionally determined by the Board.166 Neither of 
these concerns, however, justifies the Court's drastic solution of reducing 
the bargaining obligation to an empty promise. 
1. The Need for Flexibility 
The debtor-in-possession's need for flexibility constitutes the most fre-
quent chorus in support of arguments aimed at avoiding or excusing 
NLRA obligations.167 The persuasiveness of the flexibility argument is 
enhanced by two refrains of its advocates. The first emphasizes the impor-
160. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 1973 & Supp. 1985) ("such obligation [to bar-
gain collectively] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession"); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 9.9 (1970). 
161. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197 ("action by the Bankruptcy Court is required, while the 
policies of the Labor Act have been adequately served"). 
162. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201. 
163. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737 (1962). 
164. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199, 1200. 
165. ld. at 1199. 
166. Id. at 1200. 
167. See, e.g., Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199; In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 897 
(11th Cir. 1983); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Pulliam, supra note 11, at 7-8. 
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tance of the ultimate goal-saving a failing business-and claims that the 
ends sought justify the means used. Employers have asserted that, in order 
to maximize the chance of rehabilitation, the debtor-in-possession must be 
given wide latitude to restructure its financial affairs.168 The repudiation 
of burdensome contracts is a critical aspect of that restructuring. After all, 
the argument continues, if the reorganization fails, everyone loses and the 
employees being "protected" are left without their jobs entirely.169 It is 
therefore in everyone's best interest to remove all obstacles, including the 
NLRA, to the rehabilitation. The second refrain in support of the debtor-
in-possession's need for flexibility asserts that the obligation to bargain 
would impose a tremendous burden on Chapter 11 employers. Each of 
these justifications is irreparably flawed. 
a. Saving the Business at Any Cost: The Ends as justifying the 
Means 
The flexibility argument may be appealing but it goes too far if one is 
referring to all Labor Act obligations. The necessity of permitting the 
rejection of collective bargaining agreements under some standard is easy 
to accept. Neither the courts nor the commentators have ever suggested 
that a labor contract should be completely immune from rejection.170 The 
ability to reject executory contracts is an essential part of the Code's reor-
ganization scheme.171 For a labor-intensive business, the success of the 
rehabilitation efforts may very well depend on the debtor's right to avoid 
an onerous labor contract. It must be recognized, however, that this only 
excuses adherence to the NLRA's prohibition of mid-term contract modi-
fications. The separate issue of the debtor's ability to alter employment 
terms without bargaining poses a distinct statutory question independent 
of the contract. Regardless of the standard used for rejection, the duty to 
bargain remains unaffected. Even if the Supreme Court in Bildisco per-
mitted rejection under the business judgment test used for other executory 
contracts, that decision alone would not explain its failure to impose a 
duty to bargain. 
Consideration of other federally imposed obligations on a debtor-in-
possession illustrates the limited reach of the flexibility argument. While 
paying employees below the minimum wage would clearly assist the 
debtor in regaining financial stability, a Chapter 11 petition does not sus-
pend the Fair Labor Standards Act.172 Similarly, social security contribu-
168. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197-99. 
169. Id. at 1197. See In re Southern Elecs. Co., 23 Bankr. 348,363 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). 
170. See supra note 11; note 55 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
172. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (1982). 
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tions, the Occuptational Safety and Health Act/73 and environmental reg-
ulations, to name a few, all increase the cost of doing business. For some 
businesses, the cost of complying with those laws may be substantial and 
may jeopardize the ability of the debtor to rehabilitate successfully. Yet no 
one would seriously suggest that these statutory requirements be excused 
by a Chapter 11 filing. The duty to bargain cannot be distinguished. The 
Bankruptcy Code may require flexibility, but only within the bounds of 
the employer's statutory obligations. 
The Bildisco Court could have addressed its concern with flexibility by 
focusing on the collective bargaining agreement alone, independent of the 
unilateral changes in employment terms. Accepting the potential need of a 
debtor-in-possession to reduce contractual wages and benefits as part of 
the reorganization efforts, the Court could have found the agreement un-
enforceable, thereby relieving the debtor-in-possession of restrictions 
under section S(d) but leaving intact the duty to bargain.174 In other 
words, a bankruptcy court's approval of the rejection of a labor contract 
would place the debtor-in-possession in the same position as a debtor-in-
possession without a labor contract. The collective bargaining agreement 
could be avoided but not the general duty to bargain. The unilateral 
changes in employment terms would then be treated as a separate and 
independent issue under section 8(a)(5). 
In response to the union's argument that Bildisco should have been re-
quired to bargain to impasse before rejection, the Court noted that this 
assertion would impose on the debtor-in-possession "a standard little dif-
ferent from that imposed on all employers subject to the NLRA."1711 The 
Court's point ignores the fact that the debtor-in-possession already has 
been given substantial advantages over other employers by her ability to 
seek contract rejection. Reieasing the employer from the labor contract 
enables her to alter employment terms once impasse is reached, a right 
that exists only when there is no collective bargaining agreement in force. 
Thus, the Court allowed the debtor-in-possession the special privilege of 
seeking mid-term contract modifications in what otherwise would be a 
violation of section 8(d)(1-4).176 By also permitting the debtor-in-
173. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1982). 
17 4. The dissenting opinion in Bildisco recognized that the debtor-in-possession's right to alter 
unilaterally employment terms "does not necessarily follow" from the majority's conclusion that the 
collective bargaining agreement became unenforceable when the Chapter 11 petition was filed. 
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1207 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 
736 (1962), Justice Brennan noted that an employer may not lawfully alter employment terms unilat-
erally even in the absence of a contract. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1207 n.14. The argument was not 
developed further, however, because the dissenters took the position that the labor agreement remains 
in effect until rejection. Id. at 1206-10. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
175. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200. 
176. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
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possession to make such changes without bargaining to impasse, the Court 
granted a second, unwarranted privilege by excusing Bildisco from the 
separate section 8(a)(5) violation resulting from making those changes 
unilaterally .177 
b. The Myth of the Burden of Bargaining 
Critics who present the duty to bargain as an unacceptable obstacle to 
the debtor-in-possession's reorganization efforts do so by inflating the bar-
gaining obligation into a burden of overwhelming proportions-creating a 
mountain out of the proverbial molehill. That is not to say that the bar-
gaining obligation is insignificant: It is crucial to the employees and cen-
tral to the Labor Act's scheme.178 The "mountain" has developed, how-
ever, from the incorrect assumption that bargaining will block the 
employer from restructuring her company and financial obligations. 
The duty to bargain is neither an unreasonable nor a burdensome re-
quirement. The Act requires only that the debtor-in-possession meet with 
the union and discuss changes in wages, benefits, and other working con-
ditions that the employer believes are needed to assist her rehabilitation.179 
Instead of attempting to hinder the reorganization, the union may be able 
to suggest alternatives to reduce costs or to make the operations more effi-
cient.180 The union can also convey to the employer any employee prefer-
ences or concerns. The employees may recognize the need for cuts, but 
may prefer, for example, to work for reduced wages if their health and 
pension insurance benefits are maintained. This valuable interaction 
clearly cannot occur unless the union has the opportunity to discuss these 
issues with the debtor-in-possession. 
In some circumstances the union will be unable to offer any assistance 
177. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text; cf. In rt Tucker Freight Lines, 115 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2202, 2207 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983) ("[T]he new entity/successor employer 
theory enunciated in the Court decisions is not intended to provide justification for a [debtor-in-
possession's] unilateral changes of union contracts, but rather to set forth a proposition that unrelated 
entit[ies] to the preexisting contracts will not be bound."). 
In its final footnote, the Bildisco majority acknowledged that the NLRA prohibits an employer 
from altering employment terms during negotiations, citing the leading case of NLRB v. Katz, 369 
U.S. 736 (1962). Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200 n.14. The Court went on to explain, however, that Katz 
was inapplicable since it did not address the conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. Id. While the Court's 
statement is correct, it hardly constitutes a convincing reason for ignoring Katz. Since no prior Su-
preme Court cases had directly addressed the issue, the Court's reasoning would disqualify as irrele-
vant a11thority virtually every case cited in Part III of its opinion. I d. at 1197-1201. In noting that the 
debtor-in-possession remained obligated to bargain about a new contract pending rejection, the Court 
had no difficulty in citing another case, NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972), 
which dealt only with the NLRA and involved no bankruptcy issues. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201. See 
supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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to the debtor-in-possession. If so, the debtor-in-possession must bargain 
only to impasse. When it becomes clear that no agreement can be reached, 
the debtor-in-possession may lawfully implement the proposed changes.181 
The union no longer has legal power to prevent the changes or further 
impede the reorganization efforts.182 
The concern that bargaining will interfere with the success of the 
debtor-in-possession's rehabilitation may be based on. the fear that "im-
passe" will take too long to reach. This fear would be understandable if 
bargaining to impasse necessarily was a process measured in months. The 
debtor-in-possession may often need to move much more quickly if the 
business is to be saved. But the time and effort required to satisfy the duty 
to bargain can vary substantially depending on the context of the negotia-
tions. Even though bargaining to impasse can be a lengthy process in non-
crisis situations, it also can be accomplished as quickly as demanded by 
the circumstances.183 Where the employer needs to act expeditiously, im-
passe may be reached within a few days. 1M In the absence of union agree-
ment or an acceptable compromise, the debtor-in-possession can then im-
plement the proposed changes.185 As an accommodation to the policies of 
both the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA, such a result would permit the 
181. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
182. Although the union cannot legally require the debtor-in-possession to maintain wages and 
benefits at their current level, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text, it can impose economic 
pressure through a strike. As discussed supra note 129, however, a union may be unwilling to jeop-
ardize further the already unstable financial condition of the debtor. 
183. See Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305, 307 (1964) ("(T]he amount of time and discussion 
required to satisfy the statutory obligation 'to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith' may 
vary with the character of the [proposed change], the impact on employees, and the exigencies of the 
particular business situation involved. In short, the principles in this area are not, nor are they in-
tended to be, inflexibly rigid in application."); Sands Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 546, 557 (1936) ("(N]o 
general rule as to the process of collective bargaining can be made to apply to all cases. The process 
required varies with the circumstances in each case."). In its brief to the Supreme Court in Bildisco, 
the Board made a similar argument. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, at 29 n.17 
("Although in some circumstances it may be important for an employer to act quickly in changing the 
terms under which it operates, its bargaining obligation under the NLRA requires it only to bargain 
until a genuine impasse exists. In circumstances in which the employer claims a need to change 
particular terms because of severe financial hardship, the bargaining could well be quite abbrevi-
ated."); see also Brief of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, at 16 
n.21 ("The system of collective bargaining is flexible enough to adapt to the exigencies of the business 
situation. If the economic circumstances are truly drastic, and the union can offer no sufficient conces-
sion, then an impasse in the negotiations that would permit the employers to seek rejection will be 
reached far sooner than where there is ample time for"negotiations, or where the union is in a position 
to alleviate conditions and is advancing meaningful alternatives."); cf. Gulf States Mfg. v. NLRB, 704 
F.2d 1390, 1398 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Whether an impasse exists depends on whether, in view of all the 
circumstances of the bargaining, further discussions would be futile."). 
184. See Betlem Serv. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 354 (1983) (impasse reached after two bargaining 
sessions and two telephone contacts where union refused to consider terms other than those contained 
in local area industry contract); E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 753, 754 (1971) 
(impasse reached in a few days where union's alternatives to employer's proposal were "frivolous" 
and its position was "fixed"); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305, 307 (1964) (three-day notice of work 
transfer and willingness to discuss proposed change satisfied employer's duty to bargain). 
185. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 (1962). 
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debtor-in-possession sufficient flexibilty to alter employment terms within 
a matter of days as required by the reorganization, while still allowing the 
union some opportunity to discuss and affect those employment decisions. 
2. The Consideration of Labor Issues by Bankruptcy Courts 
The Court's additional justification for not requiring bargaining to im-
passe before rejection was to avoid "diverting" the bankruptcy courts with 
determinations of "impasse" that traditionally have required the special 
expertise of the National Labor Relations Board.186 The erroneous belief 
that the bankruptcy court would be required to make such judgments 
arises from the Court's initial failure to distinguish the two separate un-
fair labor practices involved. It is not the rejection of the labor contract 
that mandates bargaining but the desire of the debtor-in-possession to 
change employment terms. The bankruptcy court, within its customary 
area of expertise, would determine the propriety of rejection under the 
standard developed by the Court. Any changes in employment terms, 
however, would be subject to negotiation with the union. If the union 
claimed the debtor-in-possession failed to bargain to impasse before imple-
menting a wage reduction, for example, that charge properly would be 
handled by the Board's usual processes, just as other claims of unfair la-
bor practices are resolved during the reorganization period.187 The deter-
mination of "impasse" could and should remain with the Board, indepen-
dent of the bankruptcy court's consideration of contract rejection. 
186. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200. 
187. See NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11 11,509, at 24,159 (8th 
Cir. 1985) (Board has jurisdiction "if an unfair labor practice charge stems from a debtor's failure to 
bargain in good faith over the terms and conditions of a new contract" after rejection); NLRB v. 
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1942) ("[A) debtor in possesion is responsible 
for the unfair labor practices which occur during a reorganization. Its status as an employer is no 
different ..• than that of any other employer."); I.S.G. Extrusion Toolings, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 114, 
115 (1982) ("(T]he Board is not deprived of its jurisdiction or authority to process an unfair labor 
practice complaint to final disposition upon the adjudication of a respondent as a bankrupt.") (foot-
note omitted); M&M Transp. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 73, 75 (1978). 
Under § 362(b)(4) of the Code, the automatic stay is inapplicable to "the commencement or contin-
uation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or 
regulatory powers." 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984). The courts generally have 
agreed that NLRB proceedings fall within this exception. See Ahrens Aircraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 703 
F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1981); In re 
Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d 9, 12-13 (7th Cir. 1980); In reBel Air Chateau Hosp., 611 F.2d 
1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979). But see In re Theobald Industries, 16 Bankr. 537, 539 (Bankr. D. N.J. 
1981) (holding NLRB proceeding not within § 362(b)(4) exception because it is an adjudication of 
private rights). A stay may be imposed, however, where the Board's proceedings threaten the assets of 
the debtor. See In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co., 27 Bankr. 621, 623 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); In re 
Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d, at 13; In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., 611 F.2d at 1251; see also 
NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 103 Lab. Cas. at 24,158 (anticipated costs of litigation may be 
sufficient burden on assets to justify enjoining proceeding). The jurisdiction of the NLRB is exclusive, 
and unfair labor practice proceedings may not be removed to the bankruptcy court. NLRB v. Adams 
Delivery Serv., 24 Bankr. 589, 592 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). 
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3. Bargaining to Impasse 
In addition to providing a more rational accommodation between the 
Code and the Labor Act, requiring bargaining to impasse offers several 
other advantages. If an employer is permitted to make unilateral changes 
upon the filing of a petition, she may be encouraged to file under Chapter 
11 to avoid her NLRA obligations. If the bargaining obligation continued 
after filing, however, the employer would be more likely to begin discus-
sions before filing and perhaps even avoid Chapter 11 entirely if assisted 
by union concessions. 188 
Bargaining to impasse also would provide tangible benefits for the bar-
gaining relationship itself. A discussion of the employer's financial con-
cerns creates an opportunity for the union to propose alternatives that the 
employer may not have considered. Even if no solutions are reached 
through negotiations, the union's participation benefits both the employer 
and the employees.189 The employees and their representative are more 
likely to cooperate with the reorganization if they understand the em-
ployer's problems and feel a "part" of the rebuilding process. The frustra-
tion of exclusion can lead to animosity, which hampers the daily working 
relationship; unilateral changes also could prompt a strike, jeopardizing 
the entire enterprise.190 
Why the Court failed to address the existence of two section 8(a)(5) 
violations in Bildisco is difficult to surmise. The Court may have consid-
ered separate analyses unnecessary if it concluded that the debtor-in-
possession's contract obligations and duty to bargain to impasse were each 
independently suspended upon the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. To 
simplify the discussion, the separate unfair labor practices might have 
188. See supra note 3. 
189. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214 (1964) ('"[I]t is not neces-
sary that it be likely or probable that the union will yield or supply a feasible solution but rather that 
the union be afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate complaints ...• "') (quoting 
from the opinion below of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, East Bay Union of 
Machinists, Local 1304 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1963)); Case Comment, Duty to 
Bargain About Termination of Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 HARv. L. REv. 
768, 779-80 (1979) ("[P]articipation by employees in managerial decisions which affect their vital 
personal interests may be desirable for its own sake, apart from any dividends it may yield in terms of 
socially efficient decisionmaking. Such a- value has implicitly been recognized in the NLRA since its 
inception.") (footnotes omitted). See generally George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chap-
ter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REv. 667, 700-03 (1985) (discussing the communica-
tion value of collective bargaining apart from its usual problem-solving function). 
190. See supra note 129. On July 17, 1985, a bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania approved the 
first labor contract rejection under the new legislation. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), affd, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198 (W.D. Pa. 
1985). In response to the company's attempt to implement wage and benefit reductions after rejection, 
the union initiated the first major strike in the steel industry in over 25 years. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 
1985, at A21, col. 1. While bargaining to impasse is no guarantee that a strike will be avoided, it may 
make a strike less like! y. 
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been collapsed and examined as one. More likely, the Court was primar-
ily concerned with the perceived burdens imposed on the employer by the 
labor agreement and simply neglected to focus on the implications of its 
discussion for the bargaining obligation. Because the Court failed to rec-
ognize the significance of the duty to bargain apart from the existence of 
the contract, the Bildisco decision should be limited to its facts. The 
Bildisco Court's failure to perceive the nature of the violations may, how-
ever, intimate more serious and extensive consequences for the nation's 
labor policy than excusing a Chapter 11 employer from the requirements 
of the NLRA. 
VI. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CHAPTER 11 AND BEYOND 
While legislation now prohibits the Chapter 11 employer from unilat-
erally altering contract terms before rejection,191 the duty to bargain after 
rejection remains an open question. Bildisco may continue to be important 
as the Supreme Court's only decision addressing management-labor rela-
tions under Chapter 11. Unions will rely upon the Court's language as a 
reaffirmation of the debtor-in-possession's duty to bargain.192 Employers 
might argue that Bildisco implies that a debtor-in-possession has greater 
leeway under the NLRA than traditionally has been permitted, allowing 
initial unilateral changes after contract rejection or unilateral changes 
throughout the reorganization process. 193 
If Bildisco is to be used by the courts or the Board for guidance in 
resolving related labor relations issues within a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion, an analysis of the Court's decision is valuable in guiding its use and 
preventing its abuse. The long-term effects of Bildisco, however, may ex-
tend far beyond the confines of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court's basic 
misunderstanding of the labor law principles at issue in the case should 
give pause to advocates of both labor and management rights. By fostering 
an image of bargaining as obstructive to the employer, the Court under-
mines the ideal of the cooperative collective bargaining relationship that 
the Labor Act was intended to promote. 
A. Erosion of the Duty to Bargain: First National Maintenance 
Bildisco represents only one step in what appears to be a disheartening 
erosion of the very foundation of the National Labor Relations Act-the 
employer's duty to bargain. The Court made an earlier significant step in 
this direction in its 1981 decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
191. See supra note 103. 
192. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201. 
193. See supra notes 124-128, 130-40. 
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NLRB.w. In First National Maintenance, the Court addressed the em-
ployer's duty to bargain about the decision to close part of its opera-
tions.195 Following almost two decades of precedent/98 the Board consid-
ered the decision a "term or condition of employment" under sections 
8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act and therefore a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing.197 The Second Circuit enforced the Board's order but developed and 
applied a different standard. The court rejected a per se rule and adopted 
a presumption in favor of bargaining over partial closure decisions. This 
presumption was rebuttable, under the court's formulation, "by showing 
that the purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of a 
duty to bargain.mes 
In reversing the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court pur-
ported to establish a balancing test to be applied to partial closure and 
other related types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, 
sales, and subcontracting. Under the test, bargaining is not routinely re-
quired in such circumstances involving a business judgment outside of the 
employment relationship, even though management's decision directly af-
fects the employees and usually results in their termination.199 The Court 
focused on the "employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking" in 
these instances. A duty to bargain is therefore imposed only "if the bene-
fit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, 
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business."200 
The First National Maintenance decision prompted substantial com-
mentary and criticism.201 For present purposes, the opinion is disturbing 
for two reasons. First, the Court misconceives the role of collective bar-
194. 452 u.s. 666 (1981). 
195. Id. at 667. 
196. See, e.g., ABC Trans-Nat'! Transp., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 240, 242-43 (1980) (closing truck 
terminal), modified, 642 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1981); Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp., 239 
N.L.R.B. 323, 330 (1978) (closing electrical products plant), enforced, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); L.E. Davis, 237 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1043 (1978) (eliminating unit jobs in 
conversion to self-service unit), enforced in relevant part, 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980); Brockway 
Motor Trucks, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1003 (1977) (closing area sales and service center), enforce-
ment denied without prejudice, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978); see also George, supra note 189, at 683 
n.85 (citing cases). 
197. NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1982). The employer in First Nat'l 
Maintenance was in the business of providing maintenance services to commercial enterprises. Fol-
lowing a dispute with a nursing home about its management fees, First National Maintenance termi-
nated its contract with that client. First Nat'! Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. at 668-69. The 
First National Maintenance employees at the facility, represented by a union granted certification 
four months earlier, were discharged with three days notice. The union was given no opportunity to 
discuss the matter with the employer. Id. at 669-71. 
198. NLRB v. First Nat'! Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980). 
199. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677, 686 n.22. 
200. Id. at 679. 
201. See generally George, supra note 189, at 669 n.17 (reviewing literature). 
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gaining in the Act's scheme.202 Second, the manner in which the Court 
applied its balancing test effectively creates a per se rule excusing the bar-
gaining requirement for any partial closure decision.203 
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's presumption in favor 
of bargaining as "ill-suited to advance harmonious relations between em-
ployer and employee."204 The Court explained that the employer would 
have difficulty deciding which situations required bargaining under this 
approach. Thus, the employer would be compelled to negotiate or risk the 
"harsh" remedies of a section 8(a)(5) violation if she mistakenly deter-
mined there was no bargaining obligation.205 It is difficult to understand 
how the Court's balancing test provides a more predictable and more eas-
ily applicable analysis than the Second Circuit's presumption approach. 
Even more baffling, however, is the notion that excusing the duty to bar-
gain will advance harmonious labor relations more than requiring bar-
gaining in these situations. 
Although the decision to close part of a business almost inevitably in-
volves some conflicting goals and concerns between the employer and the 
affected employees, the employer's willingness or duty to discuss that deci-
sion with the union must certainly promote a more cooperative relation-
ship than the employer's refusal to consult with the employees' represen-
tative.206 The employees, it must be remembered, are likely to lose their 
jobs once the decision has been made and implemented-a powerful in-
centive for the development and suggestion of other options to ease the 
employer's plight. When the employer refuses to bargain, however, the 
employees have had no chance to propose alternative solutions. Even if the 
union and employer are unable to agree upon a feasible alternative, the 
opportunity to discuss and understand the employer's decision in and of 
itself can have a salutary effect on employer-labor relations. 207 
The Court in First National Maintenance was concerned only with the 
risk to ~he employer of "harsh" remedies if management erroneously de-
cided there was no duty to bargain about plans for a partial closure.208 
The Court did not address, however, the more fundamental question of 
which party should bear the burden of such a mistake. Given the devas-
tating impact on the employees involved, the employer seems a far more 
appropriate recipient. It is, after all, the employer who controls the issue. 
202. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text. 
203. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text. 
204. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684. 
205. Id. 
206. Cf NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1936) ("Refusal to confer and 
negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of [labor) strife."). 
207. See supra note 189. 
208. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684. 
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If the employer is concerned about the legal consequences of an unlawful 
refusal to bargain, she can protect herself simply by bargaining. As in 
other contexts where bargaining is required, the employer is free to imple-
ment her decision after the parties reach impasse.209 At worst, a few em-
ployers may bargain to be "safe" when they are not legally required to do 
so-not a particularly dire consequence given the policies and goals of the 
NLRA.210 
The Court's attitude towards the duty to bargain is revealed by the 
opinion's mischaracterization of the bargaining obligation as a union ben-
efit which must be weighed against the consequent interference with the 
employer. The Court correctly notes that the NLRA was not intended to 
serve the individual interests of the employer or the union "but to foster in 
a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between these interests 
may be resolved."211 The "system" to which the Court must be referring 
is collective bargaining-the mechanism established by the Act to allow 
the parties to discuss and "resolve" employment-related issues. The 
Court's misconception is found in the next sentence of the opinion: "It 
seems particularly important, therefore, to consider whether requiring 
bargaining over this sort of decision will advance the neutral purposes of 
the Act."212 If the encouragement of the "system" of collective bargaining 
is in fact the neutral purpose of the Act, the Court's statement is nonsensi-
cal. The Court's assertion, in effect, transforms the "purpose" of the Act 
into maintaining neutrality between the respective interests of the parties. 
The promotion of the process of collective bargaining becomes, instead of 
an ultimate goal in interpreting the NLRA, the union's "benefit" side of 
the balancing equation in evaluating the duty to bargain. 
The result of this transformation is evident in the Court's application of 
its balancing test to the partial closure issue. The Court almost summarily 
dismisses the "benefit" of negotiations by finding it "unlikely" that bar-
gaining would assist the employer in solving its problems.213 On the "bur-
209. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
210. Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), where the Supreme Court considered 
the issue of whether the employer's statements during an election campaign constituted unlawful 
threats or permissible "predictions" about the consequences of unionization. In response to the em-
ployer's argument that the line between the two was "too vague," the Court noted that: 
[A]n employer, who has control over that [employee] relationship and therefore knows it 
best, cannot be heard to complain that he is without an adequate guide for his behavior. He 
can easily make his views known without engaging in "'brinkmanship"' when it becomes all 
too easy to "overstep and tumble [over] the brink," [citation omitted]. At the least he can avoid 
coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will mis-
lead his employees. 
Id. at 620. 
211. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 680-81. 
212. Id. at 681. 
213. Id. 
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den" side of the balance, however, the Court lists a variety of hypothetical 
problems the business might face when considering the closure of part of 
its operation. Because the employer "may" require speed, flexibility, and 
secrecy in its action, the Court concludes that the harm "likely to be 
done" to the employer outweighs the "incremental benefit" of bargaining 
to the union/n" Since the Court at no point in this discussion addresses 
the actual burdens on First National Maintenance or the actual benefits 
of bargaining for the company's employees, the holding apparently creates 
a per se rule excusing bargaining over any partial closure decision.2115 
The First National Maintenance balancing test will become meaning-
less rhetoric if applied to other management decisions in a similar fashion. 
One can hypothesize similar potential burdens on an employer consider-
ing a plant relocation, the sale of a portion of the business, or subcontract-
ing. The benefit of bargaining will never outweigh the burden on the em-
ployer as long as the Court speculates about what burdens could exist as 
opposed to the burdens that do exist. 
Somewhere in its confusing discussion in First National Maintenance, 
the Court missed the mark. The Court regarded the duty to bargain as a 
benefit exclusively for the union and assumed that the union would use 
negotiations to hinder the employer's efforts to run a profitable business. 
Yet the "system" of collective bargaining is not one means to a neutral 
end; collective bargaining itself is the end the NLRA was intended to pro-
mote. 216 If a presumption is to be made, it is that colleGtive bargaining 
will be a productive endeavor allowing the union and the employer to 
resolve their respective concerns to the benefit of both parties.217 While 
there may indeed be instances in the partial closure situation where the 
employer's need for flexibility or secrecy should override its bargaining 
obligation, such circumstances should be the exception and not the rule. 218 
214. Id. at 682-83, 686. 
215. Although the Court later returned to the facts of the case "to illustrate the limits of [its] 
holding," id. at 687-88, this was not done until after its conclusion that a partial shutdown decision 
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, id. at 686. 
216. Id. at 674. 
217. This is not to say that the Court should have made a per se rule requiring bargaining for all 
partial closure decisions. An employer's decision to close part of a business does not involve so clearly 
a "term of employment" as the debtor-in-possession's decision to reduce wages. See id. at 677; 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
218. The developing trend away from the bargaining requirement is further reflected in recent 
Board law. As part of a growing list of cases reversing prior decisions, the current Board in Otis 
Elroator Co. II excused an employer from the duty to bargain about a work relocation decision. 269 
N.L.R.B. 891 (1984), rro'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981). The employer in that case had failed to discuss 
with the union its plans to update and consolidate its research and development functions, including 
the relocation of some employees working in that department Purporting to apply First Nat'l Main-
tenance to the issue of work relocation, the Board's plurality opinion concluded that such a decision 
would only require bargaining if it "turn[ed] upon labor costs." 269 N.L.R.B. at 892 n.3. Because the 
company's decision was based on the problem of outdated technology, Otis Elevator therefore had no 
obligation to discuss the relocation decision with the union. Unless labor costs are the motivating 
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B. The Erosion Continues: Bildisco 
By shifting its focus away from the core of the Labor Act-the duty to 
bargain-the Court in First National Maintenance began an erosion of 
the Act itself. Bildisco perpetuates the perception of the bargaining re-
quirement as burdensome to and interfering with the employer's opera-
tion. The Court in Bildisco describes the requirements of section 8(d) as 
"cumbersome and rigid," interfering with the "flexibility" needed by the 
debtor-in-possession.219 The Court's refusal or failure to recognize and 
address Bildisco's unilateral change in employment terms as an unfair la-
bor practice separate from the breach of its collective bargaining agree-
ment again reflects little sensitivity to the nature and purpose of the bar-
gaining requirement.220 
Similar to its treatment of the issue in First National Maintenance, the 
Court in Bildisco viewed bargaining as adversarial in nature, something 
from which the Chapter 11 employer must be "protected." With these 
preconceptions, the Court's conclusion that it must shield the struggling 
debtor from such destructive interference that blocks reorganization efforts 
is hardly surprising. The NLRA, under this analysis, becomes a one-
dimensional statute focused solely on union and employee rights. When 
weighed against the survival rights of the debtor-in-possession, the union's 
rights and interests must inevitably give way to the "greater good" of con-
tinuing operations. 
The Bildisco Court assumed that a union would be willing to allow a 
debtor to fail rather than concede to wage and benefit reductions, thus 
necessitating the protection of the employer from the burden of bargain-
ing. The result of destroying the company and permanently eliminating 
the employees' jobs seems so contrary to the union's interests that assum-
ing it as a behavioral norm is misguided. Such a result would rarely occur 
unless the relationship is so distrustful that the union refuses to believe 
that the wage reductions demanded are essential to the company's sur-
vival. 221 The mere possibility that a union might act against the interests 
of its members certainly should not govern the Court's determination of 
labor law principles of general applicability.222 
factor behind a relocation decision, the duty to bargain is excused under current Board law, reversing 
several decades of precedent on the issue. Id.; see George, supra note 189, at 681-90. 
219. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199, 1200. 
220. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
221. Eastern Airlines, for example, agreed, among other things, to provide its unions access to 
company financial information in exchange for an 18 to 22% wage reduction. Eastern Airlines Wage 
Concessions, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 21-22 Uan. 14, 1985). 
222. Perhaps a large union representing a very small bargaining unit in the debtor's company 
would be willing to sacrifice the unit rather than accept wage concessions which might in turn be 
demanded by competing businesses in the same industry. In the unusual instance where this occurs, 
the Court has already provided the employees with a remedy under the NLRA for the union's failure 
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The Court's view of the Labor Act ignores both the Act's purpose and 
its complexity. The NLRA quite obviously provides a number of benefits 
to the employees-the right to demand bargaining on a collective basis,223 
the consequent increase in bargaining power that generally occurs with 
collective action,22' and the right to be consulted on any changes in em-
ployment terms.225 The benefits for the employer are equally significant, 
however, even if less apparent. A variety of the Act's provisions protect 
the employer, just as the Bankruptcy Code contains protections for the 
creditors226 and employees,227 in addition to the more obvious benefits for 
the debtor.228 The protection of a collective bargaining agreement permits 
the employer to determine and project labor costs with certainty.229 Labor 
contracts commonly contain a no-strike clause prohibiting work interrup-
tions during the term of the agreement.230 Blackmail tactics used by 
unions in organizational picketing are illegal, protecting the employer 
from being forced to recognize a union that does not represent her em-
ployees.231 The Act prohibits secondary boycotts as well, allowing a com-
pany to avoid involvement in another employer's dispute.232 
The adversarial concept of employer-union relations suggested by the 
Court in First National Maintenance and implicitly adopted by the 
Bildisco majority conflicts with stated congressional policy. It was the 
judgment of the legislature that actions by both employers and labor orga-
nizations obstructed the free flow of commerce and prevented the "stabili-
zation of competitive wage rates and working conditions. "233 Congress 
chose to eliminate these obstructions "by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining" and other practices "fundamental to 
to represent its constituency fairly. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Hoff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The union's self-interest, as opposed to the interests of the employees, is 
not considered an appropriate basis for a union's representational decisions. See Strick Corp., 241 
N.L.R.B. 210, 217-18 (1979). This discussion assumes, of course, that the employees would consider 
it in their self-interest to continue in employment at reduced wages rather than be without jobs. 
223. NLRA § 7, 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1982). 
224. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985). 
225. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra note 44. 
227. See supra note 47. 
228. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
229. Since the union, as well as the employer, is bound by the collective bargaining agreement, 
the union may not lawfully demand any changes in contractual wages and benefits during its term. 
NLRA §§ 8(b)(3), 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b)(3), 158(d). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying 
text. 
230. In one survey of collective bargaining agreements, 94% of all contracts studied contained a 
no-strike provision. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACI'S (BNA) 77:1 
(1983). Even if the contract does not contain a no-strike clause, the Supreme Court has held that such 
a provision may be implied from the existence of a binding grievance-arbitration procedure in the 
agreement. See Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
231. NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158{b)(7). 
232. NLRA § 8(b){4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158{b)(4)(B). 
233. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
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the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes."2u Congress was undoubt-
edly concerned with the "right" of labor to organize but also considered 
labor peace necessary to a healthy and efficient economy. Congress viewed 
the ideal relationship between employers and labor organizations as a 
symbiotic one-a relationship of mutual benefit-not the adversarial 
model endorsed by the current Supreme Court. The Court has failed to 
acknowledge the significance of its own statement in First National 
Maintenance: "[A] fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations Act 
is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the 
flow of interstate commerce . . . . Central to achievement of this purpose 
is the promotion of collective bargaining as a method of defusing and 
channeling conflict between labor and management."235 
Even if congressional intent could be disregarded, a high price must be 
paid by both parties for shifting the emphasis away from collective bar-
gaining to an increasing deference to the business concerns of the em-
ployer. For the employer, Bildisco's subtle characterization of the collec-
tive bargaining process as obstructive may be viewed with enthusiastic 
approval. The stereotypical employer, eager to avoid unions and their cor-
responding obligations, presumably is anxious for the Court to excuse the 
duty to bargain at every available opportunity. Suspending the bargaining 
obligation, however, may require the Court to scrutinize management de-
cisions more closely. 
The Court has traditionally refused to second-guess the reasonableness 
of an employer's bargaining demands.236 While the employer must negoti-
ate in good faith, neither the Board nor the courts can dictate the terms of 
agreement or require concession to any proposal.237 Yet if the Court is 
willing to excuse the duty to bargain when that obligation becomes too 
234. /d. (emphasis added). 
235. 452 U.S. at 674 (citation omitted). See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 
{1970) ("The object of this Act was •.. to ensure that employers and their employees could work 
together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic theme of the Act was that through 
collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into 
constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement."); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42, 45 (1937) ("Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the 
most prolific causes of strife .... " "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation 
with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace . . • ."). 
236. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 {1970) ("It is implicit in the entire 
structure of the Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, 
leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties .••• [A]llowing the Board 
to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental 
premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the proce-
dure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract."); NLRB v. Ameri-
can Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) ("[T]he Board may not, either directly or indirectly, 
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining 
agreements."); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 {1937) ("The Act does not 
compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever."). 
237. NLRA § 8{d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158{d) (West 1973 & Supp. 1985). 
343 
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 300, 1985 
much of a burden or interference for the business, it must necessarily eval-
uate the justifications for the employer,s actions.238 The reasons behind 
Bildisco,s failure to pay pension contributions and a contractual wage in-
crease were evident from the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. In other 
contexts, however, the employer may subject its motives to a closer exami-
nation if the duty to bargain is to be removed. The careful scrutiny re-
quired to excuse the bargaining obligation could be significantly more in-
trusive than the more typical determination of good faith. 239 Even the 
employer adamantly opposed to unions may not be receptive to the addi-
tional governmental interference in management-labor relations that could 
result from the Court,s attitude. 
On a more fundamental level, undermining the system of collective bar-
gaining will inevitably undermine management-labor relations and the 
advantages that can be realized from that partnership. The employer-
union relationship offers the employer a variety of benefits. The union 
provides management with an orderly, structured method for dealing with 
employee problems and demands. Employers depend on unions to com-
municate to the employees. Manufacturing problems are employees, 
problems as well, and unions are often helpful in identifying mutual con-
cerns and suggesting solutions.240 Disagreements may arise frequently in 
the process, but few management or union representatives are likely to 
forget that the relationship is ongoing and ultimately depends on mutual 
cooperation. 241 The industrial strife that would result from upsetting that 
238. Cf. First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (excusing employer's duty to 
bargain about partial closure decisions). 
239. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d). See generally R. GoRMAN, supra note 100 (discussing 
requirements of duty to bargain in good faith); Cox, The Duty ro Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. 
L. REv. 1401 (1958) (examining good faith obligation). 
240. See supra note 3. 
241. See Cox, supra note 239, at 1409: 
Collective bargaining is curiously ambivalent even today. In one aspect collective bargaining 
is a brute contest of economic power somewhat masked by polite manners and voluminous 
statistics. As the relation matures, Lilliputian bonds control the opposing concentrations of 
economic power; they lack legal sanctions but are nonetheless effective to contain the use of 
power. Initially it may be only fear of the economic consequences of disagreement that turns 
the parties to facts, reason, a sense of responsibility, a responsiveness to government and public 
opinion, and moral principle; but in time these forces generate their own compulsions, and 
negotiating a contract approaches the ideal of informed persuasion. 
See also R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, T. ST. ANToiNE, & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 71 
{7th ed. 1984) ("The keynote of a desirable relationship between [the union and the employer] will be 
their mutual acceptance of the fact that each has a status in the enterprise. When they have accepted 
this elemental fact, the rudimentary legal obligations which the law may impose upon them will be of 
minor significance. . . • [T]he necessity of continuing relations calls for a code of conduct much above 
and beyond the call of legal duty."); The Role of and Challenges Facing Unions in the 1940's and 
the 1980's-A Comparison, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1062, 1077 (1984) {remarks of A. Raskin, former 
Chief Labor Correspondent of the New York Times) {"The shift has to be away from the adversarial 
stance of yore toward a cooperative industrial society based on democratic values and on equitable 
sharing of gains and sacrifices."); id. at 1062-70 {remarks by T. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer of the 
AFL-CIO, discussing need for union-management cooperation). 
344 
The Duty to Bargain 
balance would be of little benefit to either party and is contrary to the 
union-management relationship envisioned by Congress.242 
The view of labor-management relations and the collective bargaining 
process as symbiotic is unquestionably more of a goal than a reality; sev-
eral prominent union leaders have become so disillusioned by the current 
state of labor relations in this country that they believe the NLRA has 
"failed" and must be repealed or substantially overhauled.243 Nonetheless, 
it is a goal set by Congress in the Labor Act. Against this goal we must 
measure the effect of Bildisco and future Supreme Court decisions. Had 
the Court considered the relationship between the debtor-in-possession 
and the union an opportunity for mutual assistance and gain, perhaps it 
would have examined more carefully Bildisco's duty to bargain.244 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to Bildisco, there seemed little doubt that an employer's duty to 
bargain under section 8(a)(S) of the NLRA continued during a Chapter 
11 reorganization where no contract was in effect at the time of filing or 
after the rejection of an existing agreement was approved by the bank-
ruptcy court. These issues have been substantially confused by the 
Bildisco Court and were left unresolved by the legislation passed in the 
wake of the case. By failing to distinguish between the enforceability of a 
labor contract and unilateral changes in the employment terms, the Court 
appeared to allow the debtor-in-possession bound by a labor agreement 
greater flexibility under the NLRA than the debtor-in-possession without 
a contract. Such a result is illogical and unacceptable. Until the Supreme 
Court has an opportunity to reconsider the matter, Bildisco should be lim-
ited to its specific facts-unilateral changes in a collective bargaining 
agreement pending rejection-now mooted by statute. 
Bildisco is a disappointment on one level because of the potential confu-
An attitude of compromise may be reflected in the Board's current statistics on settlements of unfair 
labor practice charges. During the NLRB's 1984 fiscal year, 95.8% of all unfair labor practice 
charges were resolved before adjudication. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for FY 
1984, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 121, 122 (Feb. 18, 1985). 
242. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text. 
243. See Report by House Labor-Management Relations Subcommittee on 'Failure of Labor 
Law-A Betrayal of American Workers,' DAILY LABOR REPoRT (BNA) No. 193, at D-1 (Oct. 4, 
1984);jt. Hearings Bifore the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor and the Manpower and Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-16 (1984) (statement of Richard Trumka, President of the United Mine 
Workers of America); id. at 57-60 (statement of William Wynn, President of the United Food & 
Commercial Workers of America, AFL-CIO); id. at 71-73 (statement of William H. Bywater, Presi-
dent of the Int'I Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical, Salaried & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO). 
244. See generally Getman, The Courts and Collective Bargaining, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 969, 
970 (1983) (discussing the judicial attitude towards collective bargaining as "one of suspicion and 
hostility"). 
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sion it may create concerning the extent of the bargaining obligation of the 
Chapter 11 employer. The decision is a disappointment of far greater 
magnitude, however, when viewed as a statement of policy by the Su-
preme Court. No employer-union relationship will become a cooperative 
venture simply by stating it should be so, but it is the Supreme Court's 
obligation to promote that result. By allowing the debtor-in-possession to 
alter employment terms without bargaining to impasse, the Bildisco Court 
only pushed the parties further apart. 
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